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Don't Call Me a Securities Law Groupie:
The Rise and Possible Demise of the "Group
Pleading" Protocol in lOb-5 Cases
By William 0. Fisher*

Corporations often speak through documents. Some, like press releases,
may not identify an author. Others, like 10-Ks, bear the signatures of many
who did not write them but sign as required by law. In many cases, groups
of individuals, working together, prepare these documents. When such
documents contain misstatements, plaintiffs may not know initially who
wrote them. To address this difficulty, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Ninth and Second Circuits created a judge-made pleading protocol. This
protocol permits plaintiffs to name officers, and in some cases directors,
as defendants in securities fraud cases without pleading specific facts to
show what role each of them played in creating the statements that plaintiffs challenge.
The courts created this exception to particularity in fraud pleading before the Supreme Court decided Central Bank and before Congress passed
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the PSLRA or Act).
This Article traces the history of this "group pleading" and considers
whether it survives today.

THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE
The elements of a private lO(b) action for a misrepresentation in the
purchase or sale of a security are:
A representation made by the defendant (or for which the defendant
is responsible under 1O(b) substantive law);
Of a material fact;
That was false;

* William 0. Fisher is a partner in the San Francisco office of Pillsbury Winthrop LLP. He
is a member of the California and District of Columbia bars and a member of Pillsbury's
Securities Litigation Group. Bea Rickels proofread and checked citations and quotations.
The views expressed in this Article arc those of Mr. Fisher and should not be attributed to
his firm or its clients.
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Made when the defendant either knew the representation to be false
or was reckless in not knowing that it was false (i.e., made with
scienter);
Made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security;
On which the plaintiff relied; and
Which caused damage to the plaintiff. 1
This Article focuses on a rule allowing plaintiffs to plead the first elementthat a specific defendant ".made" a representation or is otherwise responsible for it so as to be a proper lO(b) defendant. This is particularly a lO(b)
issue because the other statutes that plaintiffs most frequently employ in
private securities litigation-sections 11 and l 2(a)(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933-define the circle of defendants without requiring that each of
them "make" a false statement.2
Private actions under section 1O(b) are "fraud" actions for purposes of
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 They are therefore
subject to that Rule's requirement that, "[i]n all averments of fraud ... ,
the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall be stated with particularity. " 4
I. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). When a plaintiff bases a lO(b) case on
an omission, the elements become:

A failure by the defendant to disclose;
A material fact;
When the defendant was under a duty to disclose that fact;
At a time when the defendant either knew the undisclosed fact or was reckless in not
knowing it;
In connection with the purchase or sale of a security;
When the plaintiff was relying on the defendant to disclose according to the defendant's
duty; and
Which caused damage to the plaintiff.

See id.
2. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Section 11 lists those who may
be sued for a material misrepresentation or omission in a registration statement. They include
all who sign the registration statement, all directors of the issuer on the date the registration
statement is filed, all directors-elect whom the registration statement identifies, and all the
underwriters for the issue. See id. § 77k(a). There is no requirement that each defendant must
himself have written a misrepresentation.
Section 12(a)(2) creates liability for all who sell or offer to sell a security by means of a
prospectus or oral communication that contains a material misrepresentation or omits to
state a material fact necessary to avoid misleading by the words the prospectus or oral communication contain. See id.§ 77l(a)(2). Under Pi.nter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), the defendants
include those who pass title to the securities so sold as well as those who "solicit" the sales.
See id. at 643. As with section 11, section l 2(a)(2) does not in terms require that each defendant
himself author a misstatement.
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
4. Id. Cases in both the Ninth and Second Circuits acknowledge that Rule 9(b) applies to
claims brought under section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993) (''A Rule I Ob-5 plaintiff must comply with
Rule 9(b) .... ");Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987)
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In cases in which plaintiffs sue multiple defendants for fraud, the complaint must set forth particular facts to show each defendant's role. A
"claimant usually may not group all wrongdoers together in a single set
of allegations. Rather, the claimant is required to make specific and separate allegations against each defendant." 5 In particular, "many courts ...
require the plaintiff to specify which defendant made each of the alleged
misrepresentations. "6
Where the misstatements appear in certain types of documents that
plaintiffs believe were written by groups, some courts allow plaintiffs to
link certain defendants to alleged misrepresentations simply by pleading
that the defendants were part of the "group" that likely put the challenged
documents together. Instead of pleading that defendant A actually authored an offending statement in, for example, a press release, plaintiffs
can include A as a defendant on allegations that A occupied a certain position at the issuer. The court may then under "group pleading" presume
that A, because of his or her position, participated in drafting the press
release. Without any further facts, "group pleading" allows plaintiffs to
allege that defendant A "made" the challenged statement and so plead
the first element of a 1O(b) case against this defendant. "Group pleading"
is thus an exception to the normal rule that a plaintiff must plead particular
facts to connect each defendant to an alleged fraud.
Judges created "group pleading." Congress did not include group pleading in any provision of the Securities Exchange Act. Federal circuits and
district courts formulate the concept in different ways. Courts in the Ninth
and Second Circuits provide the most elaborate formulations. Although
other courts have articulated variations, 7 this Article focuses mainly on
decisions in those two circuits.
This Article divides into five sections. First, it traces the development of
"group pleading" in the Ninth and Second Circuits. Second, it discusses
two abuses of the protocol-its use by some courts as a rule of substantive
law rather than simply a pleading shortcut, and its misapplication in some
decisions to the scienter element. Third, turning to the effect of Central
Bank, this Article investigates the impact of the Ninth and Second Circuits'
("Rule 9(b), which applies to securities actions brought under Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5,
requires particularity in pleading the circumstances constituting fraud.").
5. 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 9.03[1] [f] (3d ed. 2000) (footnote omitted).
6. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1297, at 97 (2d ed. Supp. 2000).
7. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 1997)
(relying in part on the Wool decision discussed ir!fra notes 8-12 and accompanying text, and
in part on In re Storage Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 630 F. Supp. I 072, I 076-77 (D. Colo. 1986),
which in turn references the Somerville decision discussed in the text accompanying note 70);
In re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 361-62 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (citing to
both Ninth and Second Circuit authorities but mixing up "group pleading" with "control
person" liability).
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definitions of primary liability on their respective "group pleading" rules.
The fourth topic is a much debated issue-the effect of the PSLRA on
"group pleading." The last section discusses whether the assumptions behind this pleading device reflect the real world of corporate disclosure.

WOOL v. TANDEM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT VERSION
Tandem Computers Inc. (Tandem) developed and produced multiple
processor computer systems. On December 8, 1982, Tandem announced
the restatement of its fiscal year 1982 revenue and earnings. Its stock
dropped and shareholders filed a class action. 8
Plaintiffs named as defendants not only the company but also three
officers: the President/CEO, the Senior Vice President/COO, and the
Vice President/Controller. The complaint did not, however, allege that
any one of these officers was responsible for any particular false number
in any identified financial statement. 9 The individual defendants moved
to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs' failure to link each defendant specifically
to the alleged fraud violated Rule 9(b). 10
The district court dismissed the claim against the individual defendants
without prejudice and then granted summary judgment to the company

8. Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987). The court summarized the alleged improper revenue recognition in this way:
Tandem's management, toward the end of each quarter, authorized shipments of equipment to carrier warehouses even though material conditions of sale remained unsatisfied. Tandem's employees prepared shipping documents which, on their face, indicated
direct shipment to customers. In reality, the supposedly "sold" equipment was merely
transferred to a warehouse and remained under Tandem's control. These and other
practices permitted Tandem to book revenue from incomplete sales.

Id. at 1435.
9. The complaint attributed financial announcements to "Tandem," alleged that "Tandem's management" had employed certain procedures that generated revenue that the company should not have recognized, and then referred to "defendants" in the charging paragraphs. See Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws and Pendant State Law
Claims, '11'1116-18, 23, 30-32 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1984) (No. C 84 20656) (on file with the The
Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law). Nowhere did the complaint detail
what role any individual defendant played in creating the financials.
10. Previous Ninth Circuit authority held that, in fraud cases involving multiple defendants, plaintiffs must specifically plead the role of each defendant in the fraud. See, e.g., Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 73 l (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal of complaint against
certain defendants in lO(b) case by holding, "the plaintiffs have failed to plead their claims
against [these defendants] with the requisite particularity. Plaintiffs have done nothing more
than set forth conclusory allegations of fraud ... punctuated by a handful of neutral facts.
The absence of particularity with respect to the alleged fraudulent participation of [these
defendants] in the coal venture scheme and the absence of specification of any times, dates,
places or other details of that alleged fraudulent involvement is contrary to the fundamental
purposes of Rule 9(b).") (citations omitted).
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on the ground that the named plaintiff could not establish the requisite
injury. 11 The Ninth Circuit reversed. Addressing the argument that the
complaint did not attribute particular fraudulent statements or acts to each
individual defendant, the Ninth Circuit found the complaint sufficient and
inaugurated its "group pleading" era with these words:
In cases of corporate fraud where the false or misleading information
is conveyed in prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports,
press releases, or other "group-published information," it is reasonable to presume that these are the collective actions of the officers.
Under such circumstances, a plaintiff fulfills the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) by pleading the misrepresentations with particularity and where possible the roles of the individual defendants in the
misrepresentations.
Wool clearly satisfied this requirement. The individual defendants
are a narrowly defined group of officers who had direct involvement
not only in the day-to-day affairs of Tandem in general but also in
Tandem's financial statements in particular. 12

ELABORATION OF WOOL'S RULE
The application of Wool raised two principal questions. The first was
who the "group" included. The second was which corporate communications were "group published."

WHO JS WITHIN THE "GROUP"?
All individual Wool defendants were officers. The opinion did not address whether outside directors could ever be "group pleaded" into a l O(b)
action. A little over one year after Wool, the Ninth Circuit decided Blake v.
Dierdoiff,13 holding that the "presumption of collective action when there
is misleading 'group published information' is equally applicable to
members of a board of directors" as it is to officers. 14 Lower courts proceeded to struggle with this notion, particularly as it applied to outside
directors. Neither the law nor practical experience suggested that outside
directors were so deeply involved in a company's affairs as to formulate

11. Wool, 818 F.2d at 1436.
12. Id. at 1440 (citations omitted). Because this pleading protocol affects only one element-the connection between the defendant and allegedly misleading statements-and
because it does so by a presumption that the defendant was part of a group that published
the statement, it is more properly called the "group published information presumption."
For convenience, this Article uses the shorter phrase "group pleading."
13. 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988).
14. Id. at 1369.
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the text of corporate disclosures, or even approve the language of those
disclosures. 15
As district courts sorted out when "group pleading" applied to outside
directors, the decisions ran the gamut. Some seemed almost randomly to
apply "group pleading" to all directors. 16 Others focused on the directors'
access to information;l7 membership on board committees; 1B involvement
in day-to-day corporate management; 19 or some disjunctive test based
upon the degree to which the directors participated in management or
had some "special relationship" with the corporation, such as actual participation in the drafting of offending documents. 2o
15. The American Law Institute's Principles ef Corporate Governance concluded that "the
board can normally satisfy the requirements of present statutes without either actively managing or directing the management of the corporation, as long as it oversees management
and retains the decisive voice on major corporate actions." 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 3.02 cmt. a (American Law Institute 1994).
16. See, e.g., Robbins v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., No. 94-1655:}, 1995 WL 908194, at *5
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1995) ("[T]he group publishing doctrine may apply to defendant officers
and directors merely by virtue of their status in the corporation, so long as the complaint also
makes an effort to allege, where possible, how the defendants' status as officers or directors
make them responsible for group published information.") (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., XOMA Corp. Sec. Litig., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 96,491, at 92,160 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 1991) ("Outside directors, although almost
by definition excluded from the day-to-day management of a corporation, can fall within the
group pleading presumption when, by virtue of their status or a special relationship with the
corporation, they have access to information more akin to a corporate insider.") (citation
omitted); In re Epitope, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 97,263, at 95,188 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 1992) (following XOMA).
18. See, e.g., In re National Health Labs. Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ~97,677, at 97,136 (S.D. Cal.July 2, 1993) ("[M]embership on the (audit or
executive] committees could provide the link or special relationship necessary for application
of the presumption."); Perskyv. Turley, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 96,483, at 92, 130 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 1991) (noting participation on Executive and Audit
Review Committees, review of 10-Qs, and signing 10-Ks).
19. See, e.g., In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 98,689, at 92,227 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1995) ("Where outside directors participate in the
management of the part of the company allegedly involved in fraud ... , the group pleading
presumption may apply."); In re Ross Sys. Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,363, at 90,496 (N.D. Cal.July 21, 1994) (dismissing claims against outside
directors with leave to amend "to allege day-to-day management"); O'Sullivan v. Trident
Microsystems, Inc., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~98,116, at
98,913 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 31, 1994) (dismissing outside directors because "plaintiffs provide[d]
no factual basis to establish involvement of [these] directors in Trident's 'day-to-day
management.'").
20. See, e.g., In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 855 F. Supp. I 086, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("By
definition, outside directors do not participate in the corporation's day-to-day affairs. Thus,
the doctrine may be invoked as to outside directors only if they are 'involved in the day-today management of those parts of the corporation involved in the [alleged] fraud,' or if they
otherwise have a special relationship or status with the corporation.") (alteration in original)
(citation omitted), ajf'd, 95 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996); In re RasterOps Corp. Sec. Litig., [19941995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,467, at 91, 194 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31,
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The Ninth Circuit settled this issue with its In re GlenFed Inc. Securities
Litigation2 1 decision in July 1995. GlenFed recognized the limited role that
outside directors play and constrained the circumstances in which "group
pleading" could bring them into a case:
Plaintiffs contend that "the Wool 'group published information' presumption is applicable to outside directors where the plaintiffs plead
that the outside directors hold positions on audit, executive and other
committees that are responsible for overseeing the corporation's financial and disclosure activities." We disagree .... The "group published information" presumption is grounded in reasonableness-and
it is not reasonable to presume in every case ... that a "corporate
scheme to defraud was collectively devised by the [outside] director
defendants." To rely upon the "group published information" presumption, Plaintiffs' complaint must contain allegations that an outside director either participated in the day-to-day corporate activities,
or had a special relationship with the corporation, such as participation in preparing or communicating group information at particular times. 22
A director's membership on board committees would not suffice. 23 Signing corporate documents would not suffice.2 4 Using connections to help
1994) ("The group pleading rule may be used as to outside directors only if they participate
in the daily affairs of those parts of the corporation involved in the alleged fraud, or otherwise
have a special relationship with the corporation."). There are other decisions focusing on
director involvement in drafting or disseminating documents or other "special relationships"
with the corporation. See In re Medeva Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) '1] 98,323, at 90,241 (C.D. Cal.June 3, 1994) ("[l]n order to invoke the 'group
published information' presumption against an outside director, the plaintiffs must allege that
the director participated in the drafting of the fraudulent documents or 'otherwise enjoyed
[a] special relationship' with the corporation."); Haltman v. Aura Sys., Inc., 844 F. Supp.
544, 548 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("The rules with respect to pleading claims against an outside
director require Plaintiffs to allege a special relationship or status with the corporation."); In
re Digital Microwave Corp. Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'IJ 97 ,044, at 94,594 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1992) (denying motions to dismiss and holding,
"[e]ach of the defendants acted as a Director of[the issuer] ... and is alleged to have directly
participated in the management of the company, as well as the dissemination of false information regarding the financial condition and status of [the issuer].").
21. 60 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 1995).
22. Id. at 593 (citations omitted).
23. See id. ("Merely because the complaint identifies a corporation's outside directors,
various committee assignments, and generic responsibilities for every committee does not
mean that the presumption of 'group published information' is applicable.").
24. Both pre- and post-GlenFed decisions so held. See Pre-GlenFed: In re Gupta Corp. Sec.
Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (acknowledging decisions holding that "the
mere fact that an outside director signed a group published document does not make the
outside director liable for the contents of the document."); In re Ross Sys. Sec. Litig., [19941995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 98,363, at 90,496 (N.D. Cal.July 21, 1994)
("[C]laims that the director merely signed some of the group published documents are not
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the issuer with an occasional business problem would not suffice. 25 Access
to nonpublic information would not suffice. 26 Receiving copies of documents before release to the public and generally "reviewing and approving" the documents would not suffice.27 Nor could plaintiffs apply "group
sufficient to meet group pleading requirements."); In re Medeva Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~98,323, at 90,241 (G.D. Cal.June 3, 1994) ("[T]he
only specific allegation against Sinclair linking him to the fraud ... is his signature on the
1992 Registration Statement and Prospectus. This allegation, by itself, does not satisfy the
elements required to invoke the 'group published information' presumption .... ")(citation
omitted); XOMA Corp. Sec. Litig., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 96,491, at 92, 160-61 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 1991) (granting directors' motion to dismiss, and
noting "[plaintiffs'] only allegations against these defendants is that they signed some of the
group published information. However, there is no allegation that these directors participated
in the drafting of these documents, or otherwise enjoyed any 'special relationship' with
XOMA. The allegations are insufficient to bring these outside directors within the group
pleading presumption."). See also Post-GlenFed: Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) ("[A]n outside director does not become liable for the contents of a group published document merely by signing it."); Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. C-95-20017
RPA, 1995 WL 743728, at *14 (N. D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1995) ("[T]he fact that [the outside
directors] signed several Fresh Choice documents filed with the SEC does not make them
liable for the contents of the documents."); Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo
Co., 940 F. Supp. 1101, 1127 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (same; relying on authority from Ninth
Circuit); In re Valence Tech. Sec. Litig., No. C95-20459, 1996 WL 67326, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 13, 1996) (same). But see In re ValuJet, Inc., Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472, 1478 (N.D.
Ga. 1997) (relying on Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988), not citing to GlenFed,
and holding "[u]nder the 'group publication doctrine,' the Plaintiffs may satisfy the pleading
requirements by alleging that an individual defendant signed a publication containing
misstatements").
It is unclear how Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc., 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000), will affect
these authorities. See infia notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
25. See Valence Tech., 1996 WL 67326, at *6 (dismissing director who was also CEO of his
own company even though plaintiffs alleged that he arranged to have personnel of his own
company assist the issuer in setting up foreign operations).
26. See Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing directors
because the "allegations do not sufficiently describe the outside directors day-to-day involvement in the corporation, but rather attempt to include these directors by virtue of their titles
and boilerplate 'access to information' language."); In re Interactive Network, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
948 F. Supp. 91 7, 921 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Extending the doctrine to cover outside directors
who, while not involved in the day-to-day workings of a corporation, are privy to inside
information does not merely make it easier for plaintiffs without information about the inner
workings of an organization to defeat a motion to dismiss. Instead, it extends the group of
possible defendants liable in I Ob-5 cases beyond those who might be responsible for making
the decision."); Strassman, 1995 WL 743728, at *13-*14 (granting motion to dismiss even
though plaintiffs alleged that the directors "had access to [the issuer's] internal operating
plan, budget, forecasts and reports."). For a similar pre-GlenFed case, see Gupta Corp., 900 F.
Supp. at 1242 ("Conclusory allegations that an outside director had access to corporate
documents likewise do not demonstrate the day-to-day involvement with corporate affairs
necessary to establish liability under the group pleading presumption.").
27. See In re Oak Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 96-20552 SW, 1997 WL 448168, at *I I (N.D. Cal.
July l, 1997) ("Plaintiffs further allege that [the outside directors], as members of the Audit
Committee ... , 'reviewed and approved the issuance of [the] false financial statements ... .'
However, Plaintiffs fail to allege these Defendants' specific roles in the review and ap-
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pleading" to outside directors with boilerplate allegations of day-to-day
involvement in the company or its documents,28 more specific assertions
that they participated in bi-monthly lunches devoted to company strategy, 29 creative pleading that directors were "in solidarity" with a CE0, 30
or charges that the directors generally controlled the overall direction of
the issuer. 31 About the only way to survive an outside director motion to
dismiss in the Ninth Circuit after GlenFed has been to plead specifically the
director's actual involvement in the preparation of the very documents that
contain the misrepresentations or are misleading because of omissions. 32
proval .... ") (citation omitted). See also Pre-GlenFed decisions: In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig.,
855 F. Supp. I 086, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (dismissing claims against outside director even
though plaintiffs pleaded that he "was privy to the contents of ... quarterly and annual
reports, press releases and presentations to securities analysts prior to their issuance, and had
the ability to prevent their issuance or cause them to be corrected."); In re Ross Systems,
[1994-1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,496 (dismissing directors in
face of plaintiffs' allegation that the directors "controlled the contents of [the issuer's]
alleged misrepresentations through receiving copies of reports and press releases before
distribution").
28. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) '1] 99,325, at 95,963 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
29. See In re RasterOps Corp. Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)'IJ 98,467, at 91,194 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1994) (denying a motion to dismiss, but noting,
"[p)laintiff's allegation concerning attendance at bi-monthly lunch meetings [at which the
company's financial condition was discussed] will not do the trick ... twice a month does
not mean day-to-clay."). The court in In re Splash Technology Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C9900109 SBA, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15370 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000), similarly rejected
allegations that a director was uncommonly involved in clay-to-day operations:
[Ilhe complaint alleges that Berger was in"frequent contact" with ... two of Splash's
top executives, received copies of Splash's internal operating and budget reports circulated to executives, signed the Prospectus and Registration Statement, signed a ...
Merger Agreement between Splash and Radius that obligated Splash officers to present
detailed budgets and projections to Splash directors ... , received copies of the allegedly
false reports and press releases prior to their issuance, and ... was appraised by weekly
and monthly reports of the status of orders for and sales of every Splash product. These
allegations, however, still do not rise to the level of establishing the requisite participation
in Splash's day-to-day activities.

Id. at *46-*47 (citation omitted).
30. See Strassman, 1995 WL 743728, at* 13-* 14 (granting outside directors' motion to dismiss, despite plaintiffs' claim that they "acted in 'total solidarity'" with CEO).
31. See id. at *14 ("The allegation that [the outside directors], along with [the CEO),
controlled the company's financial and strategic operations and other management decisions
does not address whether they were involved in the 'day-to-day' operations of [the issuer).").
32. Just how specific the allegations must be may depend on the judge. Compare the
cases discussed in note 27 with In re RasterOps Corp., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 98,467, where the court denied a motion to dismiss and held that,
"plaintiff's allegations that the outside directors participated in the preparation of documents
containing the alleged misstatements indicate a 'special relationship' with the corporation
sufficient to invoke the group pleading presumption." Id. at 91,194. Also, compare those
cases to In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 98,689
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The rules for outside directors provided a model for application of the
"group pleading" presumption to outside advisors. In Moore v. Kayport Package Express, lnc., 3 3 the Ninth Circuit held, in a limited partnership context,
that outside professionals could not be swept into a case on a group publication presumption because "unlike the situation in r+bol, the accountant,
lawyer and stockbroker defendants in this case are not a narrowly defined
group of corporate officers or directors who are alleged to have had dayto-day control over the fraudulent entities or their finances." 34
Relying on this same rationale-that defendants who did not participate
in day-to-day management could not be part of the "group"-courts held
that underwriters and consultants were not properly named as defendants
by "group pleading." 35 Venture capitalists and other large shareholders,
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1995), where the court denied a motion to dismiss and noted:
plaintiffs allege that [the outside directors) (1) signed [the issuer's] 1993 Annual Report
on Form 10-K; (2) were members of the audit and compensation committees ... ;
(3) were informed of [the) improper revenue recognition practices ... ; (4) attended
Board and audit committee meetings at which large transactions with revenue recognition issues were discussed and approved by Board members; (5) controlled the contents
of [the issuer's] financial reports, press releases and presentations to securities analysts;
(6) received copies of [the) financial reports and press releases prior to or shortly after
their issuance; and (7) had the ability and opportunity to prevent the issuance of false
statements .... By alleging that [the outside directors], as members of [the] audit committee, directly approved the allegedly fraudulent accounting practices that form the
basis of the [complaint], plaintiffs have successfully asserted day-to-day management of
the part of the Company involved in the alleged fraud.

Id. at 92,227-28. Lastly, in In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 706 (D. Del. 2000), the court
denied a motion to dismiss, citing GlenFed and other cases from outside the Ninth Circuit. See
id. at 720. The court held:
[a]lthough the complaint does not attribute any specific misstatement to these defendants, the wrong complained of-that the Company maintained declining loan loss
reserves as its loan loss rates increased-is the kind of matter that these defendants may
have been personally responsible for overseeing.... These defendants allegedly prepared,
approved, or reviewed the Company's financial statements containing material overstatements to its net income.

Id. (emphasis added). Unless courts require a high degree of specificity, form allegations that
directors participated in preparing documents will undermine the principle that outside directors should not be "group pleaded" into a case absent exceptional circumstances.
33. 885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989).
34. Id. at 540.
35. Underwriters have been held to be outside the scope of "group pleading." See In re
Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1411 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of underwriters
and quoting the outside director standard from GlenFed indicating the plaintiff "cannot rely
on the group published information exception to Rule 9(b) because the [complaint] contains
no allegations that [the] ... underwriters 'either participated in the day-to-day corporate
activities, or had a special relationship with the corporation, such as participation in preparing
or communicating group information at particular times.'") (quoting GlenFed, 60 F.3d at 593).
See also Krieger v. Gast, No. 4:99-CV-86, 2000 WL 288442, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 21,
2000) (stating that plaintiffs could not rely on the "group published information" presumption
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even those with representatives on the board, were also generally outside
the "group" absent specific charges that they participated in the issuer's
daily corporate activities or that they had in fact drafted the challenged
documents. 36
to hold liable the investment banker for an insider group where plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations in connection with the insiders' acquisition of control by merging the issuer and
shell corporation; citing primarily to Ninth Circuit authority in earlier "group pleading"
discussion); O'Sullivan v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) iJ 98,116, at 98,914 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 31, 1994) ("[I]he group pleading presumption does not apply to the underwriters."); In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp.
785, 795 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (dismissing individuals at Drexel as to issuer statements because
"Drexel was the underwriter for MDC. The position held by these parties in relation to
MDC is not analogous to that held by the officers or directors of MDC. That is, they did
not have direct involvement in MDC's day-to-day affairs or its publications.... Plaintiffs
have not alleged a special relationship between MDC and Drexel.").
Courts have also held consultants outside "group pleading." In In re Aetna Inc. Sec. litig., 34
F. Supp. 2d 935 (E.D. Pa. 1999), the court dismissed the former chairman and CEO of the
acquired company who joined the board of the acquiring company, acted as a consultant to
the acquiring company, and was a member of its Finance Committee. See id. at 949-50.
Relying on GlenFed, the court found that the plaintiffs "failed to allege any facts to support
their allegations that [this defendant] was involved in the day-to-day operations of Aetna
after the ... merger .... " Id. at 950. Similarly, in Rubin u. Trimble, No. C-95-4353 MMC,
1997 WL 227956 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1997), the court dismissed with prejudice claims against
a director and consultant even though the complaint alleged generally that each defendant
"'reviewed, edited, commented upon and participated in the preparation and dissemination
of (the] August 1995 Prospectus."' Id. at *20. The court noted, "[n]owhere does the complaint specifically allege that [this defendant] participated in [the issuer's] day-to-day activities
... or had any other 'special relationship' with [the company] .... " Id. See also In re National
Health Labs. Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)iJ 97 ,677, at 97 ,136
(S.D. Cal. July 2, 1993) (dismissing claim against firm providing public relations services to
issuer).
36. In In re Interactive Network, Inc. Sec. litig., 948 F. Supp. 91 7 (N.D. Cal. 1996), the shareholder defendant owned between 25% and 37% of the issuer's stock and had a representative
on the board. The court granted the motions to dismiss both the shareholder and the board
representative, stating:
plaintiffs have failed to plead circumstances sufficient to support a finding that [these]
defendants were involved in the day-to-day running of [the issuer]. While they have
detailed ... the financial arrangements between [the shareholder and the issuer], and
have stated that these arrangements led to [the shareholder) receiving a seat on (the
issuer's] board, they have failed to show that [the shareholder] took an active role in
[the issuer's] daily affairs. Plaintiffs may have alleged that [these] defendants had the
capacity to participate in the day-to-day operations of [the issuer), but they have failed
to allege that they actually did so.

Id. at 922. See also In re Splash Tech. Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C99-00l09 SBA, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15370, at *48-*49 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000) ("Plaintiffs allege that the
group published information doctrine extends to Radius ... since it shared a special relationship with Splash by virtue of ( l) its ownership of 20% of Splash stock, (2) Splash being a
Radius 'spin-off,' (3) the majority of Splash officers being former Radius officers, and
(4) Radius' dependence upon its Splash stock for its survival .... Plaintiffs present no authority
for the proposition that a shareholder who is not also either an officer or director may be
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The day-to-day involvement test, however, does not serve well in determining which officers should be included within a "group" presumably
preparing corporate communications. vvvol held that plaintiffs properly
named the President/CEO, the Senior Vice President/COO, and the Vice
liable under the group-published information doctrine. In addition, the example Glenfed II
gave for evidence of a special relationship-participation in preparing or communicating
group information at particular times-is absent here. Plaintiffs do not allege with particularity
any statement in which Radius played a role."); Stac Electronics, 89 F.3d at 1411 (affirming
dismissal of venture capital defendants among others and agreeing with the district court
that "group pleading" was not available against those defendants); Picard Chem. Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 940 F. Supp. 1101, 1128-29 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (Hillman defendants "exerted their influence or control over the Company because, as a group, they
controlled 20.8% of [the issuer's) common stock, had determined a majority of directors
through the October 1993 offering pursuant to a 1988 Hillman Subscription Agreement,
controlled two outside directors ... , and generally kept in continuous communication with
[the issuer's] corporate officials during the class period," yet holding nonetheless that the
"group pleading presumption does not apply to any of the main Hillman defendants.");
Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. C-95-20017 RPA, 1995 WL 743728, at *14 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 7, 1995) ("Plaintiffs allege that the group pleading doctrine applies to Rosewood, as the
largest Fresh Choice shareholder, because Adams is both a principal of Rosewood and a
member of the Fresh Choice Board of Directors. The group pleading doctrine may be applied
to a venture capital firm if the plaintiff can show that the firm's agent participated in the
preparation and dissemination of company documents containing misrepresentations. However, ... Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that Adams prepared or disseminated any
of the allegedly false or misleading Fresh Choice documents.") (citations omitted); In re Ross
Sys. Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,363, at 90,496
(N.D. Cal. July 21, 1994) (dismissing general partners of venture capital firms that sat on the
issuer's board); Gupta Corp., 900 F. Supp. at 1241 ("These claims against Novell [and] Rekhi
[a Novell Executive Vice President and a director of the issuer] ... are simply conclusory
allegations unsupported by assertions of specific day-to-day involvement in the management
of [the issuer). As such, the allegations are insufficient to bring Rekhi ... and Novell, a
minority shareholder, within the gambit [sic] of the group pleading doctrine."); In re Proxima
Corp. Sec. Litig., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,236, at 99,623
(S.D. Cal. May 3, 1994) (holding "group pleading" not applicable to venture capital defendants who collectively owned over 50% of issuer's stock prior to IPO); In re Quarterdeck
Office Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 854 F. Supp. 1466, 1474-75 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (granting motion
for judgment on the pleadings because plaintiffs failed to allege that the venture capitalists
were involved in the day-to-day operations of the issuer, despite plaintiffs' allegations that
defendants saw reports prior to publication); O'Sullivan, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,913 (dismissing both 9.5% stockholder and its representative on
the board on basis that the stockholder was "not the largest shareholder of [the issuer).
Moreover, plaintiffs have alleged no facts to establish that [the representative on the board]
has participated in the preparation and dissemination of the registration statement or other
documents that contained alleged misrepresentations."); In reJenny Craig Sec. Litig., [19921993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 97,337, at 95,724 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1992)
(dismissing claims against two institutional investors with representatives on the board; "because each of the [representatives] was only a director of [the issuer] and only one of seven,
and each of [the institutional investors] owned no more than four percent of [the issuer's]
stock, compared with the Craigs' ownership of 61 to 75 percent, the rules of group pleading
do not apply"); In re Genentech, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ii 94,544, at 93,482 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 1989) (dismissing minority shareholder even
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President/Controller on the theory that these officers were a "narrowly
defined group ... who had direct involvement not only in the day-to-day
affairs of Tandem in general but also in Tandem's financial statements in
particular." 37 That second qualification-presumptive participation in the
preparation of the offending communications-was critical. Particularly
as plaintiffs work out from the core of top officers 38 to name as defendants
virtually any officer who sold what plaintiffs consider to be a significant
amount of stock during the class period, it becomes less and less likely that
a named officer actually had any role in drafting or disseminating the
misrepresentations. The day-to-day involvement test does not discriminate

though it had a representative on the board, because "stock ownership, without more, is
manifestly not enough to establish direct involvement in corporate 'day-to-day' affairs"),
deciding motionsfor reconsideration and clarification on other matters, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ~ 94,813 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, \ 989). But see Pre-GlenFed cases: National Health
Labs., [1993 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97, 136 (denying motion to dismiss
by corporate defendants after plaintiffs argued that group published information presumption
applied, where each "had a controlling stock interest in [the issuer] and shared directors.
These entities allegedly profited from the fraud by obtaining over a billion dollars through
sale of ... stock."); Klein v. King, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 95,002, at 95,609-10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990) (holding CEO of a 20% shareholder who
sat on issuer's board was a proper "group pleading" defendant, and denying motion to
dismiss his shareholding company). A recent case reaches a similar result. See In re Imperial
Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., [2000 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,965, at
94,233 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2000) ("Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Snavely and Shugerman had a special relationship with SPF. ICI[I) owned approximately 47% ofSPF's stock.
SPF stated in its .... Form 10-K ... that 'altough [sic] the percentage ownership by ICU is
less than 50%, ICU will continue to be able to control the election of at least a majority of
the ... Board ... and to determine all corporate actions for the foreseeable future.' Through
its control of SP!<~ ICI[l) was able to elect its chairman, Wayne Snavely, as chairman ofSPF's
Board ... , [and to elect) Shugerman to SPF's board .... [TJ he sum of these factors ... is
that Snavely and Shugerman had a special relationship with SPF exceeding that of a typical
outside director. As a result, Snavely and Shugerman are subject to the group published
information doctrine for statements made by SPF.") (citation omitted).
37. Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987).
38. In some cases, it seems odd to presume that even all senior officers participated in
drafting the asserted misstatements. In re Marion 1\4.errell Dow Inc., Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer
Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 97,776 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 1993), concerned allegedly
false statements assuming FDA approval of a prescription drug for over-the-counter use
despite knowledge of adverse reactions by patients. The decision denies motions to dismiss
by, among others: the Executive Vice President for Research and Development, who was
also a director; the Executive Vice President, who was also the President of Marion Merrell
Dow Research Institute and a director; the CFO, who was also a director; and the Vice
President/Controller. See id. at 97,765-67, 97,773. The court reasoned that the "group publication" doctrine roped in all officers and directors alleged to "be in day-to-day control of
the company's management or finances." Id. at 97,766. Although those involved in research
might have known of the adverse reactions to the drug, absent discovery it seems less likely
that the CFO and Controller knew and even less likely that they actively participated in
drafting the press releases or other statements about the prospects for FDA approval for nonprescription use.
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between those officers who had such a role and those who did not. All
officers, simply by going to work, participate in the daily affairs of their
companies.
District courts in the Ninth Circuit have veered in differing directions
as they have applied "group pleading" to officers. Some decisions rely on
a "functional relationship" between the officer's position and the nature
of the alleged fraud. 39 Although this test narrows the circle of defendants
somewhat, it does not focus on the purpose of the "group publication"
protocol-to permit plaintiffs to name as defendants those who presumably drqjled the misrepresentations. A vice president in charge of European
sales would presumably make periodic reports to his superiors in a corporation and thus would have some "functional relationship" with any
39. E.g., Smith v. Network Equip. Tech., Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,659 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1990). In dismissing certain officers, the court
found the plaintiffs' use of "group" allegations overbroad:
Plain tiffs have used group pleading indiscriminately to reach every officer of [the issuer].
In essence, Plaintiffs argue that Wool allows group pleading against anyone denominated
an officer without regard to the nature of the fraud alleged by Plaintiffs, or the functional
connection between the activities of an individual defendant and the activities involved
in the fraud .... [I] n the present case, Plaintiffs allege a fraudulent scheme involving
marketing, accounting practices, and fraudulent releases of information. Plaintiffs do
not allege any improper conduct involving the design or manufacture of [the issuer's]
products .... [I1here is insufficient evidence to bring the following individual defendants within the Wtiol group: ... Vice President and Chief Technical Officer; ... Vice
President of Operations; and ... Vice President of Corporate Development. Defendants
argue, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that these three individuals are involved in the
design and manufacture of [the issuer's] products. Thus, they are not connected with
the scheme alleged by the Plaintiffs, and cannot be properly included in the 'group'
covered by group pleading under Wool.

Id. at 98,093-94. See also Molinari v. Symantec Corp., No. C-97-2002 l:JW, 1998 WL 78120,
at * 11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1998) ("In a company as large as Symantec, the status of officer
or director is not enough in itself to establish involvement in the group 'functionally related'
to the alleged fraud."); Strassman, 1995 WL 743728, at *14-*15 ("Plaintiffs assert that the
group pleading doctrine also applies to insiders Wells and Sherwin [respectively the corporate
secretary and vice president of human resources] by virtue of the fact that both are Fresh
Choice officers who had access to internal corporate documents. The fact that an individual
defendant is an officer of the corporation, even if he or she is involved in the day-to-day
management of the company, is not enough to invoke the group pleading doctrine. Instead,
the officer must have some functional relationship with the alleged fraudulent activity....
Nothing in the [amended complaint] suggests that Wells had any functional relationship with
any of the alleged misrepresentations .... As for Sherwin, he is alleged to be vice-president
of human resources. As such, Plaintiffs assert that Sherwin was acutely aware of Fresh
Choice's lack of management personnel to control and support the Company's growth which
Plaintiffs claim forms the basis of several misstatements. However, ... all allegations concerning misrepresentations centering on Fresh Choice's lack of management have been dismissed with prejudice. Therefore, since there are no alleged misrepresentations remaining
involving Sherwin as vice-president of human resources, the group pleading doctrine may
not be invoked against him.") (citing Smith, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 95,659) (citations omitted).
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fraud concerning sales in Europe. It is not "presumably" true, however,
that that vice president would have any role in the characterization of
European results included in an annual report or a press release with
quarterly financials. The vice president might be consulted, and arguably
should be consulted. On the other hand, it could just as easily be argued
that sales executives, who tend to be optimistic as a breed, have no necessary role in preparing Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, annual reports, and press releases. Whatever the proper practice
should be, the probability that the vice president will draft or even review
the portion of the report or release describing European operations is not
so high that the vice president should be presumed to have authored any
mischaracterization of European sales and so automatically be included
as a defendant in a securities lawsuit based on such a misstatement.
Aside from employing the "functional relationship" test, some Ninth
Circuit district courts have expanded or contracted the officers included
within the "group" based on the size of the issuer and the geographic
dispersion of its operations. 40 These opinions, however, place too much
faith in the ability of a district judge, at the outset of a case and without
the benefit of any discovery, to determine how a corporation works. For
example, when a corporation is small and geographically concentrated, it
may well be that all officers participate in the preparation of all significant
public announcements. It is also possible, however, that the different officers in a developing company have very different strengths and may not
even possess the qualifications normally associated with the formal positions they hold. They may delegate public disclosures to one or more of
their number whose talents appear suitable to that task, regardless of title.
40. The court in Smith, (1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,959,
emphasized that "[i] n large corporations, with far-flung offices and divisions, the status of
officer or director is not enough in itself to insure involvement in the group functionally
related to the fraud." Id. at 98,093-94. See also In re USA Talks.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., Master
File No. 99-CV-O 162-L(JA), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14823, at* 11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2000)
("Because the individual defendants are inside, controlling persons ofUSAT, a small company
with only four full-time employees, and allegedly acted together with regard to other disclosures, the [complaint] need not draw a specific connection between every alleged misrepresentation and a particular defendant."); In re Aldus Sec. Litig., (1992-1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)~ 97,376, at 95,988 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 1993) (dismissing defendant
"because during the Class Period he presided over an Aldus subsidiary in Scotland, and thus
could not have been connected with the alleged misrepresentations"); In re Epitope, Inc. Sec.
Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 97,263, at 95,188 (D. Or.
Nov. 30, 1992) (refusing to exclude three vice presidents in part by distinguishing the company
from Network Equipment: "Epitope is not a 'large corporation with far-flung offices and
divisions,' but rather a local company which bases a substantial portion of its operations and
future income on a single product ... .");In re U.S. Bioscience Sec. Litig., 806 F. Supp. 1197,
1203-04 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (relying primarily on Ninth Circuit cases to deny dismissal "because
Bioscience is a relatively small start-up company with only forty people in the entire enterprise, each officer and director can be expected to bear more responsibility and have greater
knowledge of the venture than an officer ... in a large, well-established corporation").
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Small companies may also lack corporate routines to ensure the circulation
of draft public disclosures to all appropriate officers before publication.
Indeed, such companies may be dominated by a single strong individual
who does not involve others in important announcements. An assumption
that all officers in smaller, geographically concentrated companies are
within some "group" preparing all corporate disclosures ignores all these
circumstances.
The best-reasoned lower court decisions require plaintiffs to plead facts
showing that all officers named in the "group" were "directly" involved
in creating or communicating the allegedly misleading publication. 41 This
is the very test suggested by U0ol-that the "group" should be "narrowly
defined" and should have "direct" involvement in the challenged document. 42 It is also the test that focuses on the purpose of the presumption.
That test yields an important corollary: an officer can only be a member
of a "group" when he or she is at the company. The pleading exception
should not apply to officers who left a company before a statement was
"group published" or who joined the company after that publication. 43
41. E.g., In re Oak Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 96-20552 SW, 1997 WL 448168, at *I I (N.D.
Cal. Aug. I, 1997) ("To establish the liability of the vice president Defendants under the
group pleading exception, Plaintiffs must satisfy a necess<1rily stricter requirement. Since all
of the inside officers in a corporation, by virtue of their positions, are involved in daily
corporate activities, merely pleading as much is not sufficient to establish their liability under
the group pleading exception. To establish the liability of these Defendants for Oak's allegedly
misleading statements, Plaintiffs must plead that these vice presidents were directly involved
'not only in the day-to-day affairs of [Oak] in general but also in [the preparation of its]
financial statements in particular.' The existing Complaint does not allege that these Defendants participated in the preparation or communication of allegedly misleading information.
Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the liability of the vice president Defendants under
the group pleading exception.") (quoting Wool, 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987)). The
court in In re Splash Technology Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C99-00 I09 SBA, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15369, at *82 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000), recently followed Oak. See also Copperstone
v. TCSI Corp., No. C 97-3495 SBA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *54 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 19,
1999) (granting motion to dismiss because, "[CJ or corporate insiders, a plaintiff must plead that
the Defendants were involved in the preparation of the allegedly misleading statements" in
order to invoke group pleading, and the complaint did not allege any facts showing that "the
inside directors were directly involved in the preparation of" the challenged representations).
42. See Wool, 818 E2d at 1440.
43. In Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc., 175 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1019
(1999), the court affirmed dismissal of the former CEO:
Dawson resigned as Valence's CEO on April 30, 1993. The district court held that since
Plaintiffs failed to specify the nature of Dawson's operational involvement in Valence
after that date, they were not entitled to the 'group published information' presumption.
Plaintiffs did allege in their Third Amended Complaint that Dawson remained Chairman of the Board until October 30, 1993. They also alleged that Dawson retained
significant holdings in Valence after his resignation as CEO, and that he sold more than
$30 million in stock in the months following. Plaintiffs did not, however, allege that
Dawson had any operational involvement in Valence's day-to-day corporate activities.
In fact, the Third Amended Complaint contains no allegations of how Dawson controlled or otherwise significantly influenced the alleged misstatements made by Valence
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WHAT CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS ARE "GROUP
PUBLISHED"?
If the first task in applying Wool was identifying the individuals within
the "group" doing the publishing, the second was identifying what that
"group" "published." Wool itself referred to "prospectuses, registration
statements, annual reports [and] press releases" but also referenced unspecified "other 'group-published information.' " 44 One decision held that
"Wool's relaxed pleading rule applies ... only to publicly-held companies."45 Other opinions apply the pleading protocol to a Confidential Information Memorandum, Offering Memorandum, and Merger Agreement in what appears to be a private stock sale; 46 and even to offer sheets
given to retiring employees as part of an effort to repurchase their stock.47
District courts in the Ninth Circuit have limited the protocol, however, by determining that many communications are not "group published." They have not extended Wool to oral statements. 48 They do
not apply the presumption to analysts' reports, 49 articles in the financial
after his resignation. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the claims against Dawson to the extent they are based on alleged misstatements made after his resignation.

Id. at 706-07 (footnote omitted). See also In re PETsMART, Inc. Sec. Litig., 61 F. Supp. 2d
982, 998 (D. Ariz. 1999) (asking rhetorically: "Do plaintiffs mean to suggest ... that Hansen
had the opportunity and was motivated to inflate the price of stock for a convertible note
offering which occurred five months after his departure? Or that Schnabel should be held
responsible for optimistic statements made during 1996 even though she didn't arrive until
February of 1997? ... [Plaintiffs] cannot combine the group pleading doctrine with an
allegation of a fraudulent scheme to avoid pleading critical details."); Aldus, [1992-1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,988 ("[D]efendants argue that all posttermination 1Ob-5 claims against [three former officers] must be dismissed as group pleading
cannot extend past the dates they left Aldus. Plaintiffs ... do not respond to this contention,
and on this basis, all post-termination claims against [those three] are hereby DISMISSED.").
44. 818 F.2d at 1440.
45. Wanetick v. Mel's of Modesto, Inc., 811F.Supp.1402, 1405-06 n.l (N.D. Cal. 1992).
46. See J.F. Lehman & Co., Inc. v. Treinen, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) '\191,046, at 94,869 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2000).
47. See Walsh v. Emerson, Nos. 88-952-DA, 88-1367-DA, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18289,
at *9 (D. Or. Oct. 2, 1989) (comment made in context of evaluating ERISA claim).
48. See XOMA Corp. Sec. Litig., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'\196,491, at 92,161 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 1991) ("[B]y its very nature the group pleading
presumption does not apply to oral statements by individual defendants-only to group published
information."). See also Krieger v. Gast, No. 4:99-CV-86, 2000 WL 288442, at *9 (W.D.
Mich. Jan. 21, 2000) (" [B] ecause the presumption applies only to written documents, it
encompasses statements or omissions in the Notice [of a shareholders meeting] but does not
apply to the oral statements which Krieger alleges Warren Gast made at the shareholders
meeting."); Schlagel v. Learning Tree Int'!., [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'IJ 90,403, at 91,815 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1998) ("The Court agrees that even before the
PSLRA, the group publication doctrine could not be applied to oral statements. The PSLRA
has only strengthened the requirement that allegations of oral misrepresentations be attributed to specific individuals rather than lumping defendants together.") (citations omitted); In
re Interactive Network, Inc. Sec. Litig., 948 F. Supp. 91 7, 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("[I] he group
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publication doctrine cannot apply to oral statements. This is clearly true."); In re Picard Chem.
Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 940 F. Supp. 1101, 1128 (WD. Mich. 1996) ("[T)he
group pleading presumption does not apply to oral statements made by individual defendants."); In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("[O]ral
statements attributable to individual defendants are actionable, if at all, against only those
defendants."); Hi/fn, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-99-4531 SI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11631, at
*36 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2000); Copperstone v. TCSI Corp., No. C97-3495 SBA, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *53 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 19, 1999); Pleasant Overseas Corp. v. Hajjar, No.
C93-20197 RMW (EAi), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20981, at *20-*21 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18,
1992).
Some decisions, however, have included oral statements within the "group pleading" presumption. For example, in LB Partners, L.P. v. Neutrogena Corp., (1995-1996 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,913 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1995), the plaintiffs alleged that the
CFO's statement that the company knew of no reason for the rise in stock price was false
because the company was in negotiation for purchase by a larger company at an abovemarket price. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Vice President/Treasurer/Secretary deliberately directed inquiries to the CFO and that he and the CEO/Chairman "arranged for
and authorized" the CFO to make his statement. Id. at 93,404. The court held that although
in this case the CFO "made an oral statement, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that this
was 'other "group published information'" under Wool." Id. at 93,405. See also Rolex Employees Retirement Trust v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 749 F. Supp. l 042, 1044 (D. Or. 1990)
(denying motions to dismiss I O(b) claim against five officers where some of the challenged
statements were oral-e.g., "Some people have us at $1.50 (a share for 1990), and we think
that's aggressive in terms of the economy. Some have us at $1.10, which is rather conservative .
. . . The $1.25-to-$ l .30 range, I think that's the range we would feel more comfortable with.")
(omission in original). Others suggest that, with the right pleading, oral statements could fall
within IM!ol. For example, in In re RasterOps Corp. Sec. Liu'g., (1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,231 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1994), the court stated, "it is not reasonable
to presume that oral statements by individual defendants are the product of ... collective
efforts." Id. at 99,603. Here, the plaintiffs provided no facts to indicate that statements made
at a technology conference attended by securities analysts and the press, or statements that
an identified defendant made in announcing the promotion of a Vice President, were "the
collective actions of the officers rather than the statement of an individual defendant." Id.
"Absent such facts," the court held, "plaintiffs may not invoke the group pleading doctrine
with respect to these oral statements." Id.
49. See In re Network Equip. Tech., Inc. Litig., 762 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
("[I]ndependently published statements by financial analysts are not 'group published information.'"). See also RasterOps Corp., (1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
99,603 (same); In re Ross Sys. Sec. Litig., (1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 98,363, at 90,499 (N.D. Cal.July 21, 1994) ("[P]laintiffmay not use group pleading
to attribute third party financial analyst reports to individual defendants because such reports
are not 'group published information.'"); Fisher v. Acuson Corp., No. C93-20477RMW
(EAi), 1995 WL 261439, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1995) (same); Leonard v. NetFRAME
Sys., Inc., (1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,982, at 93,781 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 1995) (same); Pleasant Overseas Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20981, at *20;
Coppers/one, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *53. At least some cases, however, hold out the
possibility that analyst reports might be attributed to the corporate "group" if the analyst
reports themselves were based on corporate "group" publications. For example, in Gupta
Corp., 900 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1994), the court denied a motion to dismiss "group
pleading" claims founded on analysts reports which were allegedly based on the company's
published third and fourth quarter results. See id. at 1241. The court stated:
In cases where the analyst reports are actionable against the defendant corporation, the
central inquiry for determining whether the reports are also actionable as group pub-
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press,s0 or transaction documents, such as leases. 51 Documents specifically
attributed to individuals are also outside the protocol. 5 2 This is appropriate
because MtOol creates a pleading "presumption." Although it is possible
that a CEO/President would seek review and comment from others on his
message to shareholders in an annual report, it is far from certain that he
or she would do so. The top executive may see the message as a personal
statement-his one chance to tell all shareholders his view of the company's
performance and his plans and vision for the future. Courts should not presume that such messages are a joint product of the executive cadre. 53

lished information is whether the source of the reports' information is group published
information. Thus, analysts' reports based on financial statements and press releases
which are actionable against the defendant corporation are also actionable as group
published information. By contrast, analyst reports which are based on oral statements
by identified individuals are not actionable as group published information, because the
underlying oral statements are not group published information.

Id. at 1240. Also, in Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 'I) 99,436 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 1997), the court denied a motion for summary
judgment because plaintiffs came forward "with evidence tending to show that the analysts'
statements could fall within the group published exception to the preclusion of liability for
third party forecasts." Id. at 96,860.
50. See Steiner v. Hale, 868 F. Supp. 284, 288 (S.D. Cal. 1994) ("[T]he court also rejects
the plaintiff's request to extend the group publishing doctrine to the publication of newspaper,
journal, and magazine articles .... The court finds the doctrine does not apply to newspaper
or journal articles prepared by individuals not associated with the corporation. The defendants have no control over the reporters or what is ultimately contained within the article.
Thus, the reasoning behind the doctrine, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, is not applicable
to this situation."). As with analysts' reports, however, there is some authority for applying
the presumption if the article is itself based on corporate group information. See In re Keegan
Management Co. Sec. Litig., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I! 96,275, at
91,483 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1991) ("The only allegations which do not refer to group published information are those which relate the comments of market analysts in a financial
newsletter and a business magazine. However, since these comments are actionable only to
the extent that they are based on group published information, the presumption also applies
to them.") (citation omitted).
51. See Benedict v. Cooperstock, 23 F. Supp. 2d 754, 762-63 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (relying
primarily on Ninth Circuit cases to find that the "group pleading" doctrine did not apply to
promissory notes, equipment leases, and service agreements delivered to individual plaintiffs
as part of an alleged Ponzi scheme).
52. See Pegasus Holdings v. Veterinary Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1165 (G.D.
Cal. 1998) ("[W]ritten or oral statements made by an identified defendant cannot be classified
as 'group published' information."). See also Molinari v. Symantec Corp., No. C-97-20021]W; 1998 WL 78120, at * 10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1998) (stating, without limitation to oral
presentations, that "[s]tatements made by an identified individual are not group published
materials.").
53. But see In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 'I! 99,325, at 95,965 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) (applying "group pleading"
to a report to shareholders including a letter signed by the Chairman of the Board/CEO
which contained allegedly misleading statements about shipment of a product).
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Because some forms of corporate communication are not subject to
"group pleading," plaintiffs must identify the form of a statement before
they can take advantage of that protocol. 54 Even if plaintiffs adequately
allege the substance of a communication, Wool cannot apply unless plaintiffs specifically plead the form and that form is among those which are
"group published."

THE SECOND CIRCUIT VERSION: A TRIO OF
PARTNERSHIP CASES SETTING OUT PRINCIPLES ALSO
APPLICABLE TO CORPORATIONS
The Second Circuit developed its "group pleading" protocol in the
context of limited partnership transactions, where organizers and promoters frequently create a welter of partnerships and corporations to conduct a business. There are three principal cases.
Luce v. Edelstein5 5 was the first. The twenty plaintiffs had invested in a
limited partnership which was to renovate buildings in New York City and
convert them into condominium units for artists and art-related businesses.
The thirteen defendants included the limited partnership itself, as well as
two corporate general partners, four other corporations and a partnership
which were affiliates of and allegedly controlled the corporate general partners (who were the affiliates' alleged alter egos), and five individuals who

54. See Autodesk, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '\191,260, at
95,429 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2000) ("Nor do plaintiffs specify which of the allegedly misleading
statements provide the basis for the application of the 'group published information' doctrine.
The ... doctrine applies to written documents originating with the company, such as press
releases, prospectuses, and SEC filings. By definition, it does not apply to third-party reports,
such as reports issued by analyst~, transcripts of interviews with company officers or directors,
or reports of oral representations made by officers or directors."); In re Sunrise Tech. Sec.
Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '\197,042, at 94,585 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
22, 1992) ("By its very nature the group pleading presumption does not apply to oral statements by individual defendants. Therefore, plaintiffs must allege facts that establish that the
allegedly misleading statements were, in fact, 'group published' .... [P]laintiffs' allegations
consist almost entirely of statements that 'Sunrise announced' .... Plaintiffs never allege
where the alleged misrepresentations appeared-i.e., were these 'announcements' made in a
press release or some other presumptively group-published forum, or were they made in
private conversation? ... Absent such allegations ... plaintiffs cannot employ the group
pleading presumption."). See also Smith v. Network Equip. Tech., Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '\195,659, at 98,093 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1990) ("Paragraphs
34, 40-42, and 46 of the Amended Complaint allege unattributed misrepresentations which
were communicated in unidentified forms to financial analysts and the press. These allegations fail to allege specifically either particular misrepresentations by identified defendants, or
particular misrepresentations published through identified forms of group published information. Thus, these allegations arc inadequate and are stricken from the complaint with
leave to amend.").
55. 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
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were "past or present directors and officers" of the two corporate general
partners. 56
The district court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction, dismissed portions of the complaint on the basis of a forum selection clause,
and dismissed other allegations for failure to plead fraud with sufficient
particularity. 57 The Second Circuit affirmed denial of the preliminary injunction and enforcement of the forum selection clause but reversed in
part the Rule 9(b) dismissal and remanded to permit plaintiffs to amend.58
The court found that some of the alleged misrepresentations in the Offering Memorandum passed 9(b) muster: allegations that the general partners
represented they would make capital contributions of$385,000 when they
actually contributed approximately $80,000, and allegations that the cost
of renovating the buildings would be $4,500,000 when liabilities for the
still incomplete project already exceeded $10,200,000. 59
In the course of the opinion, the Second Circuit spoke directly to the
specificity with which the complaint had to tie each defendant to the fraud,
noting that, "no specific connection between fraudulent representations in
the Offering Memorandum and particular defendants is necessary where,
as here, defendants are insiders or affiliates participating in the offer of the
securities in question."60
This formula was broad and threatened to sweep into limited partnership cases virtually any company or individual who had anything to do
with the proposed business at the time the limited partners bought their
interests. The Second Circuit's second case recognized this problem and
circumscribed the pleading rule.
In Di Vittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Industries, Inc., 61 plaintiffs had purchased
interests in a limited partnership formed to obtain and exploit coal properties and oil leases. They sued everyone in sight: (i) the limited partnership
itself; (ii) the corporate general partner and its parent; (iii) two affiliated
corporations that were, respectively, a contract driller and a contract
miner; (iv) an affiliated corporation that sublet properties to the partnership; (v) a subsidiary of the corporate parent of the general partner that
served as the manager and syndicator of the parent's real estate interests
(the manager I syndicator); (vi) the current vice president of the corporate
general partner; (vii) a former vice president of the corporate general partner; (viii) a director of the corporate parent of the general partner and
director of the manager/syndicator who was a past or present officer of
the general partner's parent and the manager/syndicator; (ix) a controlling
shareholder and president of the general partner's parent who was also
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 52.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
822 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1987).
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president of the general partner, and the secretary-treasurer and a director
of the manager/syndicator; (x) a law firm; (xi) an accounting firm and one
of its partners; and (xii) a contract driller that was not owned directly or
indirectly by the corporate general partner or its parent. The district court
dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 9(b).62
The Second Circuit reversed as to the limited partnership, the corporation that was the general partner, and the corporate parent of that general partner. 63 The court of appeals affirmed, however, as to all other
defendants:
The amended complaint identifies Eastern only as an "affiliate of the
General Partner, and the Contract Miner for the Partnership's coal
properties"; EDC as "an affiliate of the General Partner, and the cocontracting driller ... for the development of the Partnership's oil
properties"; Eastland as "an affiliate of the General Partner, which
... sublet coal properties to the Partnership"; and Properties as "a
subsidiary of Equidyne ... [which] serves as a manager and syndicator of Equidyne real estate investments". These allegations are inadequate to charge these defendants with liability for misrepresentations in the Offering Memorandum.
None of the individual Equidyne defendants, Ross, Beeler, Rock
and Liebmann, is tied to the Offering Memorandum in any specific
way, or even alleged to have been an officer or director of any nonindividual Equidyne defendant when the Offering Memorandum was
issued or the specified class of plaintiffs bought their limited partnership interests.6+
As to the law firm defendant, the accountant defendants, and the drilling
company that was not owned by the partnership's organizer, the court
found no allegations "sufficient to describe any of them as insiders or
affiliates," or "linking any of them in any specific way to any fraudulent
misrepresentation or omission,'' and therefore affirmed their dismissal. 65
Ouaknine v. MacFarlane 66 completes the trio of principal Second Circuit
cases. In Ouaknine, plaintiff bought stock in a company that put the money
into a partnership between that company and MacFarlane Perry Company. MacFarlane Development Company was a contractor for the underlying business project-renovation and sale of cooperative apartments
in New York City. Plaintiff alleged misrepresentations in the offering memorandum for the stock and the limited partnership agreement, which plaintiff saw before buying the stock. Plaintiff sued the partnership, MacFarlane
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1244.
Id. at I 249.
Id. at 1248-49 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1249.
897 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Perry, Macfarlane Development, and two individuals: Robert MacFarlane, who appeared to be the organizer of the venture, and an accountant who worked for Macfarlane and who allegedly induced plaintiff to
agree to the sale of stock in yet another corporation. The district court
dismissed.
The Second Circuit reversed in part, holding that all of the defendants
were properly named on the securities claim, except MacFarlane Development.67 The court characterized DiVittorio as holding that "allegations
merely that [a] defendant is an affiliate and contracted to perform work
are insufficient to link [the] affiliate with representations in [an] offering
memorandum. " 68
Luce and Di Vittorio were limited partnership cases. Although the plaintiff
in Ouaknine had purchased stock, the proceeds of his investment were then
transferred to a partnership. It was clear, nevertheless, that the Second
Circuit would apply this trio of"group pleading" decisions to corporations.
In making its "group pleading" holding, Luce cited to two district court
cases, 69 both of which involved alleged corporate wrongdoing: Somerville v.
Major Exploration, Inc., 70 denying a motion to dismiss and holding that "for
the most part, plaintiffs allegations with respect to these defendants involve
misstatements or omissions in documents-annual reports, financial statements-that may be presumed to entail the collective actions of the directors, officers, and the accountant, in some cases";7 1 and Pellman v. Cinerama,
Inc., 72 denying a motion to dismiss on facts involving an allegedly false
proxy statement and observing that the "defendants here are all insiders
... and numerous courts have held that the conduct of such individuals
need not be specified if the complaint sufficiently describes the fraudulent
acts and provides the individuals with sufficient information to answer. " 73
Moreover, although not part of the trio discussed above, Cosmas v. Hassett74 confronted exclusively corporate facts and seemed to apply "group
pleading" in that setting. Cosmas vacated dismissal of a lawsuit against eight
directors brought by a securities purchaser alleging misleading statements
by one officer I director in a magazine article and misleading statements in
an annual report, a 10-K, and press releases. One defendant "signed the
1985 Annual Report and the 1985 1OK, and, according to the amended
complaint, the other defendants read these documents before they were
issued." 75 The court found that the complaint "adequately identifies the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 84.
Id. at 80.
Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986).
576 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y 1983).
Id. at 911.
503 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y 1980).
Id. at 111.
886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at IO.
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defendants as those responsible for the statements." 76 Oddly, although decided after both Luce and DiVittorio, Cosmas cites to neither.77

ELABORATION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT RULE
The Second Circuit "group pleading" protocol raised the same two
questions as the Ninth Circuit protocol: (i) to which defendants did the
"group pleading" exception apply (in this case, what entities and individuals were included within Luce's "insiders and affiliates"); and (ii) to what
communications did the exception apply. Because the Second Circuit's
cases include so many cases decided in the limited partnership context,
this Article will address these questions first there and then in the corporate
setting.

TO WHAT DEFENDANTS DOES THE LUCE EXCEPTION
APPLY IN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP CASES?
In the limited partnership context, the Luce exception to the general rule
that a complaint must connect specific misstatements with particular defendants waives that pleading requirement for the "individuals who organized, promoted and/ or managed the ... partnerships and the affiliated
corporations controlled by these individuals. " 78 The "insider or affiliated"
entity defendants typically include the general partners, managing companies, and corporations or partnerships actually involved in the sale of
the limited partnership interests. 79
76. Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
77. Only a few cases cite Cosmas as "group pleading" authority. See, e.g., Benedict v. Amaducci, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,830, at 93,010 (S.D.N.Y
July II, 1995).
78. Hayden v. Feldman, 753 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y 1990) (citation omitted). See also
Parnes v. Mast Property Investors, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 792, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that
Luce applied to individual defendants who were officers of the corporate promoter of the
limited partnerships in a case where plaintiff alleged that defendants participated in or directed the writing and distribution of the offering memoranda).
79. The definition is elastic. See ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'! Corp.,
[1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 99,345, at 96, JOO (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 23,
1996). The court applied the Luce exception to MERMCI which was a wholly owned subsidiary of MIC, and a general partner in the limited partnership in which plaintiffESI bought
an interest. MIC retained a 28% interest in the partnership through its related entities. MMT
was a common law trust created for the benefit of MIC and its affiliated companies, and was
also a limited partner. The court found that the Luce exception applied to MERMCI, holding:
MERMCI is an indirect subsidiary of defendant MIC and therefore is an affiliate of
MIC. MIC agreed with defendant MMT that MMT would sell a portion of MMT's
interest in the partnership to ESI. Thus, MERMCI is an affiliate in the sale offer for
an interest in the Partnership. Moreover, while the DiVittorio court found that the Luce
rule did not help the complaint overcome its defective particularity because the
complaint solely identified the parties at issue as affiliates, ESI has described that:
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Some limitations to the group of "insiders and affiliates" are well established. Lawyers and accountants who perform traditional, professional
roles in preparing offering documents are not within the group.BO Nor are

(1) MERMCI contributed its assets to the Partnership; (2) MERMCI became and remained a general partner in the Partnership; and, (3) that plaintiff, MERMCI, MMIC
and MMGP executed an agreement specifying their respective partnership interests.
Thus, the complaint sufficiently alleges MERMCI to be an affiliate.

Id. at 96,100 (citations omitted). See also Boley v. Pineloch Assocs., Ltd., [1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) if 95,407, at 97,001 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 2, 1990) (pleading
exception applicable to CCL-Associates and CCL-Cornerstone, "[p]laintiffs allege that CCLAssociates, and by implication its general partner, CCL-Cornerstone, participated as insiders
in the fraudulent preparation of the Memorandum .... Plaintiffs refer to the facts that CCLAssociates is the administrative general partner of Pineloch and received fees in connection
with its organization, and that typically an administrative general partner is responsible for
the preparation of placement memoranda and circulation to underwriters. They also refer
to Moran's report [Moran was a general partner who had provided an affidavit to the
Bankruptcy Court] of involvement by 'Cornerstone ... ' in the preparation and review of
the Memorandum.").
80. See DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1249 (2d Cir. 1987)
(finding attorney and accountant defendants outside the Luce group). Also, in Morin v. Trupin,
809 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y 1993), the court found that
[a]lthough partners and principals in partnerships are insiders, and affiliates, controlling
stockholders, officers and directors of partnerships are insiders ... [o] utside attorneys
and accountants will not be considered controlling persons unless they have influence
over the day-to-day operations of the offering entity. Here, in contrast to earlier pleadings, the Plaintiffs allege that the professional defendants are insiders, who knowingly
and consciously participated in the scheme to defraud. The Plaintiffs must therefore
allege some form of immediate control over operations, or else plead sufficient connections between these defendants and the certain allegedly misleading statements which
can be ascribed specifically to them to meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).

Id. at 1087 (citation omitted). The court then granted leave to file an amended complaint
against attorneys and accountants because plaintiffs had alleged their connection to specific
misrepresentations. Id. at 1090. In Morin v. Trupin, 778 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y 1991 ), the
plaintiffs alleged that an attorney (Abrams), who was the in-house counsel for the entities
involved in the syndication, "participated" in drafting certain sections of the Private Placement Memorandum and "supervis[ed] and direct[ed]" an outside law firm in connection
with the offering materials, but did not allege that any false statements appeared in the
sections that Abrams drafted himself. Id. at 718. The court held that the attorney was not
an insider and that the complaint did "not adequately plead a connection between Abrams
and [the allegedly misleading] statements." Id. In another case, Stevens v. Equidyne Extractive
Indus. 1980, 694 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y 1988), the court found that, "[s]ince [counsel] in
drafting the offering memorandum was acting not on its own behalf but on that of the
Equidyne defendants, it is not a corporate insider and therefore the relaxed standards of
pleading with respect to who said what do not apply." Id. at 1062. The court also held the
accounting firm was "not an insider but in effect an independent contractor" and therefore
"cannot be held for general statements in the Offering Memorandum not specifically attributed to it." Id. at 1063. Continuing, the court found accountants were answerable for representations of tax benefits in Pro Forma Financial Illustrations that they prepared, but the
illustrations were accompanied with sufficient cautionary language that the accountants were
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independent brokerage firms that market partnership interests,8 1 companies that provide contract service to a partnership's business, 82 or consultants to a partnership. 83 Some decisions also import the "day-to-day" in-

dismissed. Id. at 1064. See also Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 730 F.
Supp. 521, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), eff'd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 199 l) (unpublished table decision)
(noting authority "for the proposition that where counsel drafted the offering memorandum
and were acting on behalf of the general partner, they are not, without more, corporate
insiders or affiliates to whom the relaxed pleadings standards are applicable .... [T]hey are
not ordinarily liable for the general statements in the offering memorandum but rather
plaintiffs must specifically attribute misstatements or omissions to them.") (citation omitted);
Klein v. Churchill Coal Corp., Nos. 84CfV.6509 (WK), 1988 WL 92114, at *IO (S.D.N.Y.
May 5, 1988) ("In a securities fraud suit arising out of the sale oflimited partnerships, 'insider'
status generally extends to the general partner and to affiliates involved in preparation of the
offering memoranda, but not, in the absence of special circumstances, to the law and accounting firms who assist in such preparations.").
81. See Pahmer v. Greenberg, 926 F. Supp. 287, 308 ("Because (the broker/ dealer defendant] was not an insider and because the complaint does not allege any specific facts indicating that [the defendant] attained insider status, the claims against it for securities fraud
arc not subject to relaxed Ruic 9(b) pleading standards."), alf'd sub nom, Shapiro v. Cantor,
123 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1997); Eickhorst v. American Completion and Dev. Corp., 706 F. Supp.
1087, 1092-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (dismissing national brokerage firm acting as selling agent for
limited partnership interests and holding, "(m]ere conclusory allegations of insider status ...
without accompanying facts which tie a defendant to the offering materials in a specific way,
will not suffice to obviate the need to specify each defendant's connection with the alleged
fraudulent acts .... There are no allegations that Hutton had any role in preparing the
prospectus or the brochure describing (the limited partnership]. Moreover, no facts are presented to support the allegation that Hutton was closely involved with the activities of (the
limited partnership] or the other defendants, or that Hutton actually stood in the position of
an insider with relation to the sale of the interests ... Plaintiffs ... allege that a 'close
association' existed among [two of the individual defendants] and certain unidentified members of Hutton's 'top management'. ... Nowhere in the complaint, however, is the factual
basis set forth for this conclusion. Likewise, plaintiffs offer no source of facts for their assertion
that these unidentified members of the 'top management' at Hutton 'pushed' the sale of the
[limited partnership] interests because [the two individual defendants] 'were friends and/or
close associates of members of Hutton's top management'. ... There arc simply no facts
presented to warrant an inference that a close relationship or friendship actually existed, or
to ascertain what individuals might have been involved in such a relationship and if they
pushed the sale of the [limited partnership] interests. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish Hutton as an insider."). See also Boley v. Pineloch Assocs., Ltd., 700 F.
Supp. 673, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("PaineWebber is not an insider or an affiliate; thus, some
basis for its alleged role must be stated.").
82. See Di Vittorio, 822 E2d at 1248-49 (finding an affiliated mining company (Eastern), an
affiliated drilling company (EDC), and an unaffiliated drilling company (Inland) not insiders
in case where limited partnership sought to exploit coal and oil leases); Chamarac Properties,
Inc. v. Pike, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)iJ 97,802, at 97,950 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 1993) (holding that plaintiff could not use "group pleading" against a company that
managed properties beneficially owned by certain partnerships in which plaintiff's limited
partnership owned interests).
83. The court in Morin, 809 E Supp. I 081 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), found that an outside adviser
(Continental) and its president (Organek) were not insiders for purposes of a private placement memorandum. Id. at 1095. The court wrote:
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volvement concept, or something similar, in order to limit the circle of
individuals who can fall within the Luce exception. 0 4
The line describing the circle of "insiders and affiliates," however, is illdefined. The courts have provided no formal definition of these terms. 85
Moreover, DiVittorio left the status of "affiliates," however they might be
defined, so unclear that one court wrote: "to be charged with liaThe Plaintiffs allege that the Offering Materials disclosed that Continental advised the
Rothschild Group between 1983 and 1987 in connection with approximately 18 real
estate syndications, including the Sacramento Associates Offering, involving 13 commercial real estate properties. They allege that Organek was more of an insider than
either the (accountants) or (the attorneys], and that his sole employer was Trupin [the
man who founded and controlled the Rothschild Group). Organek's duties in the Trupin
hierarchy, they allege, included locating real estate to be syndicated; acquiring these
properties for the Rothschild Group; negotiating the acquisitions; structuring the transactions and financing the acquisition of the properties; obtaining loans for the acquisition
of these properties; financial restructuring when syndication revenues did not generate
sufficient funds; conducting the Rothschild Group's due diligence investigation preceding the acquisition of the properties; and obtaining and reviewing real estate information
regarding the syndicated properties for inclusion in the relevant private placement
memorandum.

Id. at 1094. The court then stated, "[t]hese allegations of [Continental's and its president's)
activity to promote the interests of the syndication are still too insufficiently particular to link
either to the preparation of the PPM or the sale of the partnership interests." Id. The court
nevertheless permitted plaintiffs to file their amended complaint against Continental and
Organek based on an alleged misrepresentation of a brokerage fee in the PPM. Id. at I I 00.
On reconsideration, the court reversed and found that no claim could be made against
Continental and Organek:
The Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Organek actually knew, or culpably
refused to see, how the fees were being characterized in the Sacramento PPM. Without
providing more to demonstrate Organek's "insider" status, his inaction will not make
him liable.... [T]he Plaintiffs do allege that Organek participated in the day-to-day
operations of Sacramento Associates .... [T]hese general allegations ... are insufficient
to survive Rule 9(b).
Morin v. Trupin, 823 F. Supp. 201, 206 (S.D.N.Y 1993).
84. For example, in Andrews v. Fitzgerald, 823 F. Supp. 356 (M.D.N.C. 1993), the court
found that the "[p] lain tiffs have sufficiently pied facts of insider status and day-to-day involvement as to the Fitzgerald defendants so that Plaintiffs can take advantage of. . . l#ol
and Luce." Id. at 374. Securities claims against an officer and director and one-third owner
of the other corporate general partner-KPWIC-were dismissed, however, because "[u)nlike
other Defendants who allegedly worked with the managing general partner ... and were
involved in the Partnership's day-to-day affairs, or, like KPWIC, served as a general partner
of the Partnership, there is no such 'tie-in' for [this individual defendant)." Id. at 374-75
(emphasis in original). See also Bruce v. Martin, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'IJ 96,964, at 94, 118 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 13, 1992) (granting motion to dismiss by director
and member of two-man Finance Committee of corporate general partner because there
were no allegations that he participated in the management of the corporate general partner
or of the limited partnerships).
85. For example, research finds no decision tying the definition of an "affiliate" under
Luce to the definition of "affiliate" in the securities regulations. See 17 C.F.R. § 230. l 44(a)( I)
(2000).
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bility for misrepresentations, an affiliate must ... be tied to the offering
memorandum in some, albeit non-specific, way . . . ." 86

TO WHAT COMMUNICATIONS DOES THE LUCE
EXCEPTION APPLY IN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP CASES?
The Luce court carved out its pleading exception for "representations in
the Offering Memorandum. "87 As to other representations, however, Luce
sustained the argument that the complaint failed to connect particular
statements to specific defendants:
[P]aragraph 68 of the complaint alleges: "During the course of the
project, defendants continually misrepresented to the plaintiffs and
the class the cost, status and expected completion date of the project."
Paragraph 84 alleges: "Upon information and belief, defendants made
oral and written representations to plaintiffs and the class regarding
their returns on investment and cash and tax benefits apart from the
Offering Memorandum. These further representations occurred,
upon information and belief, both before the Closing and thereafter in
connection with further solicitation oflimited partners." Such allegations, which fail to specify the time, place, speaker, and sometimes even
the content of the alleged misrepresentations, lack the "particulars"
required by Rule 9(b).R8

DiVittorio also dealt with an offering memorandum, although at one point
it referred to "an offering memorandum or similar document .... " 89 The
Ouaknine plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations in an offering memorandum
and a related partnership agreement, and the decision appears to apply
Luce to both.9° In other limited partnership cases, lower courts in the Second Circuit have been somewhat reluctant to extend Luce beyond offering
documents. 91
86. Morin v. Trupin, 747 F. Supp. 1051, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added). The case
of Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 816 E Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), is an example of how elastic
the "insiders and affiliates" concept can be. It ruled that two companies were "insiders"
where one of them was the parent (and the other the parent of the parent) of a company
which was, in turn, one of two joint venturers in a joint venture that promoted and syndicated
the limited partnerships. Id. at 928. These companies were sufficiently connected with the
private placement memoranda by the actions of an individual defendant who was an officer
of each of the two companies and also president of the joint venture. Id.
87. Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986).
88. Id. at 54 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
89. DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 922 F.2d 1242, 1248 (2d Cir. 1987).
90. Ouaknine v. Macfarlane, 897 E2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1990).
91. For example, in Morin, the court found that "to the extent [plaintiffs) concededly rely
upon nonparticularized oral representations or written statements extrinsic to the offering
memoranda ... [such as marketing literature and projections and oral sales pitches], plaintiffs
are obligated under Rule 9(b) to give the specific defendants charged with such communicative acts more specific notice ... [and observe] the obligation to specify the factual basis
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TO WHAT DEFENDANFS DOES THE LUCE EXCEPTION
APPLY WHEN A CORPORATION IS THE ISSUER?
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit has not addressed in any
studied way the reach of "group pleading" in cases where plaintiffs bought
securities issued by corporations. With its principal cases authored in the
comparatively free-form world oflimited partnership deals, it is small wonder that district courts applying those precedents to corporations have
reached differing conclusions, particularly as to which entities and individuals may be embraced within the "insiders and affiliates" that constitute
the Second Circuit's "group."
The decisions addressing whether directors are within the "group" illustrate the point. Somerville, Pellman, and Cosmas-all early decisions-seem
to treat directors the same as officers (as "insiders"), without any effort to
identify outside directors and analyze separately the wisdom of applying
the "group" exception to them. 92 Although some later opinions hold that
for holding a particular defendand responsible for a particular act .... " 747 F. Supp. at
1061-62. In another case, Dymm v. Cahill, 730 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D.N.Y 1990), the court held
that the plaintiff did "not allege that the misrepresentations were conveyed through an offering memorandum; in fact, he asserts that '[n]o offering memorandum ... was provided
... .' Therefore, he must provide each defendant with sufficient notice of that defendant's
part in the fraud ... .'' Id. at 1250-51 (citation omitted). In Tobias v. First City National Bank
and Trust Co., 709 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D.N.Y 1989), the court determined that the plaintiff could
not take advantage of the Luce rule where misrepresentations were "ascribed to either the
private placement memorandum or oral statements, or both." Id. at 1277. But, see ES/
Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay /nt'l Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 99,345 (S.D.N.YJan. 22, 1996), where the court held, "[plaintiff] does not have to
allege that [defendant deemed to be an 'affiliate' within the meaning of Luce] prepared or
caused the preparation of the Confidential Investment Memoranda or the Representations
[outside the Memoranda] provided to [plaintiff] prior to purchase." Id. at 96,101. The
representations outside the Memoranda were included in schedules of sources and uses and
in other statements repeated both orally and in writing. The court noted that "the Second
Circuit in Di Vittorio expressly included 'similar documents' as within the exception applicable
to an offering memorandum with the caveat that both categories of documents must then
satisfy certain criteria in order for the exception to be applicable." Id. at 96,100 n.5.
92. See, e.g., Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1989) (reporting that "the eight
named defendants were directors of [the issuer]" and later further identifying one of them
as the CEO); Somerville v. Major Exploration, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 902, 911 (S.D.N.Y 1983)
(holding that documents such as "annual reports, financial statements ... may be presumed
to entail the collective actions of the directors, officers and the accountant, in some cases.")
(emphasis added) (citation omitted); Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 107, 108, 111
(S.D.N.Y 1980) (identifying defendants as "various officers, directors, and controlling shareholders of Cinerama," and stating that "[t]he defendants here are all insiders .... ") (emphasis added). See also Friedman v. Treasure Island N.V., No. 99Civ.2882 (PKL), 1992 WL
111371, at *6 (S.D.N.Y May 4, 1992) (holding nine directors in without any discussion of
which were inside and which were outside); Quantum Overseas, N.V. v. Touche Ross & Co.,
663 F. Supp. 658, 667-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding plaintiff qualified for Luce exception by
pleading that the individual defendants were "officers and/or directors [of the issuer and]
were able to and did control the content of [the issuer's] public statements [and] SEC filings
during the class period and of a Prospectus dated September 14, 1984 ... .'').
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outside directors are not within the Luce circle,93 a number of district courts
have found circumstances such as serving on a committee or signing a
document to forfeit "outsider" status even for directors who do not hold
an office in the corporation. 94 There is no clear distinction like the "day93. For instance, in Fisk v. Superannuities, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y 1996), the court
distinguished in dicta "outside directors," among others, from the "insiders" who need not
be particularly connected to misstatements. Id. at 727-28. In Bank ef f!ermont v. Lyndonville
Savings Bank & Trust Co., 906 F. Supp. 221 (D. Vt. 1995), the court held that where a complaint
identified four defendants as "directors and employees" but gave "no indication whether
these defendants held additional management positions or owned large shares of corporate
stock," they would be treated "as outside directors. As a result, [the] complaint must connect
the allegations of fraud to these particular defendants." Id. at 226. In Klein v. Goetz:.mann, 770
F. Supp. 78 (N.D.N.Y. 1991 ), the court found that outside directors, including those on an
Audit Committee and who signed the 10-K and allegedly signed an Annual Report were
not "insiders" for "group pleading." See id. at 81-82. In Thornock v. Kinderhill Corp., 712 F.
Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the plaintiffs bought limited partnership interests, and Kinderhill
Corporation was a general partner. The court found:
The Complaint does not allege that the outside directors [of Kinderhill] made any
misrepresentations or omissions. The alleged misrepresentations were contained solely
in the private placement memoranda and other documents "distributed by the Kinderhill defendants" generally without differentiation among defendants. There are no
allegations that the outside directors participated in the management of Kinderhill or
of partnerships named as defendants in this action.

Id. at 1128-29 (footnote omitted). Continuing, the court noted:
Although it is true that where defendants are insiders or affiliates participating in an
offer of securities, "no specific connection between fraudulent representations in [an]
Offering Memorandum and particular defendants is necessary," plaintiffs have cited no
such rule where the defendants were outside directors who are not alleged to have
participated in the offer of securities in question, and where no facts allege the contrary.

Id. at 1129 (citation omitted).
94. More specifically, in In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the
outside directors moved to dismiss because the complaint did not make specific allegations
of wrongdoing by the defendants. As the court explained,
[p]laintiffs contend, however, that the Complaint meets the particularity requirement
by alleging that the Outside Directors, as members of the Audit Committee, were responsible for reviewing Livent's reporting procedures, internal controls, and management information systems, and the performance of [the auditor], and primarily responsible for reviewing the unaudited quarterly financials. The Complaint also alleges that
the Outside Directors failed to investigate, or ignored, the "red flags" signaling the fraud.

Id. at 219. The court found that "[t]he Outside Directors are alleged to have been reckless
in not discovering such schemes and in participating in the approval and dissemination of
the misstatements in the documents filed with the SEC. The particularity with which the
'red flags' are alleged, combined with the group pleading doctrine, meets the 9(b) standard."
Id. In Greenfield v. Prqfessional Care, 677 F. Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), the plaintiffs alleged that
three individual defendants "served as members of [the issuer's] audit committee, in which
capacity they were responsible for monitoring [the issuer's] internal and external audit functions, control systems, financial accounting and reporting, and adherence to applicable legal,
ethical and regulatory requirements." Id. at 114-15 (citation omitted). "[T]he complaint
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to-day involvement" test in the Ninth Circuit, and non-officer directors
are at considerably more risk of being "group pleaded" into a case in New
York than in California.
Lawyers, accountants, and independent broker/dealers, on the other
hand, are generally not "insiders or affiliates" for Luce purposes in a corporate setting any more than they are in the limited partnership context. 95
charges that each of these defendants signed an amended registration statement on l\fay 30,
1995, and a Form I OK on January 9, 1986, after the corporation was informed of New York
State's investigation and after the Albany office director informed [the issuer's] corporate
counsel of the ongoing fraud." Id. at 115. The court held that "[w)hile there is some dispute
as to whether these defendants should be treated as insiders or outsiders, on the facts pleaded
these defendants appear to be much closer to the position of an inside director than they are
to that of a typical outside director." Id. See, e.g., Hallet v. Li & Fung, Ltd., [1996-1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 99,318, at 95,909-10 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 23, 1996) (denying
motion to dismiss by defendant Hsieh and stating, "[a)lthough Hsieh was an outside director,
he sat on the board to represent Cyrk's largest shareholder, Li & Fung BVI. The complaint
alleges that, in addition to being Cyrk's largest shareholder, Li & Fung receives more than
$2 million in fees for locating manufacturers in Asia for Cyrk's promotional products. The
complaint also alleges that Hsieh sat on Cyrk board committees and had access to Cyrk's
internal forecasts, budgets and plans. Plaintiff claims that Hsieh regularly reported to Li &
Fung about Cyrk's business, plans, and future prospects. Each of the defendants is alleged to
have signed [the) Registration Statement, to have had power and influence over Cyrk, and
to have caused it to engage in illegal practices. Furthermore, Li & Fung BVI sold all of its
shares ofCyrk during the class period. Li & Fung BVI is specifically charged in the complaint
with having orchestrated, with Cyrk's 'top officers,' a publicity campaign in order to keep
stock prices high until they sold their shares. The complaint also specifically alleges that
'Cyrk's insiders and largest shareholder worked closely with Montgomery Securities,' Cyrk's
underwriter, to accomplish the fraudulent scheme. The facts as pleaded support the reasonable inference that Hsieh participated in the allegedly fraudulent representations and was
aware of the adverse information ... alleged to contradict those optimistic representations.
In short, the allegations support the inference that Hsieh is more akin to a corporate insider
than an outside director.") (footnotes and citations omitted); MTG Elec. Techs. Shareholders
Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 979-80 (E.D.N.Y 1995) (denying motion to dismiss by two members
of audit committee by noting, "[defendants] argue that they are 'outsiders,' ... I find these
arguments unconvincing .... [These defendants] are alleged to have signed prospectuses
containing materially false and misleading information. Moreover, [they] together constituted
the Audit Committee-a committee charged with the responsibility of overseeing the work of
[the auditor] ... [P]laintiffs' allegations ... reveal fraud, theft of securities and the fabrication
of financial information by senior management at [the issuer]. In short, the complaint alleges
massive accounting fraud during the class period. Considering that [the two defendants] were
charged with overseeing the conduct of [the issuer's] accountants[,] I would conclude that
the complaint satisfies ... Rule 9(b), even if the allegations against them were limited to their
status at [the issuer] and their signing of fraudulent prospectuses.") (footnote omitted); Kimmel v. Labenski, (1987-1988 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 93,651, at 97 ,990
(S.D.N.Y Feb. 9, 1988) (finding that Luce insiders or affiliates "arguably" included three
outside directors who signed I OK).
95. See Fisk, 927 F. Supp. at 727-28 (distinguishing "lawyers [and] accountants," among
others, from Luce "insiders"). There is no reason that attorneys and accountants should be
"insiders" in the corporate context if they are not in the limited partnership setting, and the
cases in note 80 supra, should apply to attorneys and accountants engaged to represent
corporations.
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Nor is a commercial bank providing some of the financing for a project. 96
Large shareholders of an allegedly offending issuer generally should not
be "group pleaded" into a case under Second Circuit law. One decision
finds that two companies that held stock in the issuer and shared directors
with the issuer could not be "grouped" into a case because there was "no
allegation of interaction among or between these corporate entities sufficient to justify the treatment of [the two stockholders] as insiders," 97 and
another suggests that shareholders become insiders only if they play "active
daily roles in the relevant companies or transactions." 98 The "insider or
affiliate" test, however, is so loose that some decisions are bizarre.99
96. In Burke v. Dowling, 944 E Supp. l 036 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), the court held the bank which
allegedly "assisted the preparation of the acquisition, financing, and historical sections" of
one Private Placement Memorandum in an alleged Ponzi scheme to convert Irish castles into
luxury hotels, and "assisted in the preparation of the acquisition financing sections" of a
second Private Placement Memorandum was not an insider, even though the bank was the
primary lender for both projects. Id. at 1063. It noted that "[m]ere preparation of sections
of an offering mcmorand[um], however, docs not make a drafter an 'insider or affiliate.'
\'\1ithout a more specific indication as to what statements in the offering memorandum [the
bank] drafted, plaintiffs cannot allege fraud in the sale of securities under § I O(b) on [the
bank's] part." Id. at l 063-64.
97. Brickman v. Tyco Toys, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1054, l 061 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
98. Polar Int'! Brokerage Corp. v. Reeve, 108 F. Supp. 2d 225, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In
this case, the court held that "group pleading" was available against a company formed for
acquisition, the private equities firm organizing that company, independent directors of the
seller who served on the board committee evaluating the offer, other individuals at the seller
who agreed to invest in the acquiring company, and investment banking defendants who
invested in the acquiring company. Id. at 238. The court found it was not available, however,
against insurance companies who invested in the acquiring company as institutional investors,
holding:
it is impossible to characterize the Insurance Company Defendants as corporate insiders
with direct involvement in the daily activities of the relevant companies or intimate
knowledge of the challenged transaction .... The Insurance Company Defendants'
status as institutional investors in [the acquiring company] is insufficient to render them
corporate insiders such that the group pleading doctrine applies.

Id. See also Isanaka v. Spectrum Technologies. USA Inc., No. 99-CV-1358 (LEK/DRH), 2001 WL
19791 l, at *5-*6 (N. D.N. Y. Feb. 18, 200 I), in which the court interpreted prior district court
decisions to apply group pleading to individuals with direct involvement in the everyday
business of the company who are in a narrow group of high ranking officers or directors
participating in the preparation and dissemination of a document.
99. Friedman v. Treasure Island N.V., No. 90Civ.2882 (PKL), 1992 WL 11137 l (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 1992), is one of the worst, though it dismisses the case on bases other than plaintiffs'
failure to connect defendants with misrepresentations or omissions. Id. at* 11. Plaintiffs had
purchased debentures. The issuer's parent and sole shareholder was a joint venture. The
Plaintiffs named 27 defendants and the court found that all but one (a corporate defendant)
were insiders or affiliates for purposes of the Second Circuit "group pleading" rule. Id. at* l,
*6. These included: the joint venture/parent, the nine companies that were the joint venturers, the "principals" of the joint venture (nine individuals, seven of whom were also directors of the issuer, and one trust), and the subsidiaries through which the issuer did business.
One individual defendant was simply a member of the board of the joint venture, but
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Although it is hard to find a clean decision addressing whether underwriters in a firm commitment underwriting are within the Luce pleading
exception, Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. Nat f!Vtist Finance, Inc. 1oo suggests that such
underwriters risk being swept into the group. Gabriel denied a motion to
dismiss by two firms that were initial purchasers of notes that they then
sold to institutional investors, including the plaintiffs. The firms moved to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not identify which statements
they supposedly authored in the Offering Memorandum. The court found
that activities underwriters typically perform placed these defendants
within the Luce "group:" "Plaintiffs allege that NatWest and McDonald
arranged the financing of these Notes, drafted the Offering Memorandum,
went on road shows, and sold the Notes to plaintiffs and others. Those
allegations are sufficient to cast NatWest and McDonald as 'insiders or
affiliates.'" 101
Similar to the Ninth Circuit's "day-to-day" involvement test, the Second
Circuit's "insider" test does not distinguish well between officers. All officers are "insiders" in the sense that they work inside the issuer. The cases
reveal no limiting principle, such as the "functional relationship" concept
that some district courts in the Ninth Circuit have employed, and the
Second Circuit itself has not emphasized, as did the Ninth Circuit in Wool,
that the circle of officers should be restricted to those directly involved in
preparing the violating documents. The Second Circuit "group" can accordingly reach into a corporation below the top officer level to embrace,
for example, a manager of marketing, 102 the president of a subunit within
was not a director or officer of the issuer. He was nevertheless "alleged to have been [an] ..
. insider by virtue of his beneficial ownership of 2 112% of the common stock of [the issuer]."
Id. at *6.
100. 94 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
IOI. Id. at 502-03 (citation omitted). The court was unmoved by the argument that
NatWest and McDonald were "initial purchasers, not underwriters" under Rule 144A. Id.
at 503. "Although NatWest and McDonald were not underwriters for purposes of the 1933
Act, their participation in the financing and sale of the Notes, especially with respect to
drafting the Offering Memorandum, make them 'insiders or affiliates' under Luce." Id. See
also Waltree Ltd. v. ING Furman Sel<:, UC, 97 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), where the
plaintiff sued both ING Bank (Bank) and ING Barings (Barings). Bank had loaned money to
Tatarstan and issued notes, which Barings "placed" and plaintiff bought. The complaint did
not address the corporate relationship between Bank and Barings and lumped both defendants together. The court found that "group pleading" was appropriate because the facts of
that relationship were exclusively within the defendants' knowledge. Id. at 469 n.6. The court
noted, "there is little dispute that both ING entities were intimately involved in the Loan
and the issuance of the Notes," and the court held the allegations put the defendants on
sufficient notice of the charges against them. Id.
l 02. See, e.g., MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(finding one defendant to be an "insider" where that individual was the Manager of Marketing, was the son of one and the nephew of another of the two most powerful officers of
corporation, marketed products in the United States, was listed in numerous press releases
as the contact person at the corporation, was a defendant in a suit for fraudulent conversion
of company stock, and "clearly had at least peripheral involvement in the Chinese joint
venture agreements ... " that were at the heart of the case).
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the corporation, 103 corporate secretaries, 104 and vice presidents. 10 5 As in
the Ninth Circuit, however, officers or directors in Second Circuit cases
whose tenures fall outside a class period should not be within a "group." 106
I 03. The court in Mcholas v. Poughkeepsie Savings Bank/ FSB, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 95,606 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1990), relied on Ouaknine to deny
Michael Feeks' motion to dismiss in a case where plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations and
omissions regarding the adequacy of loan loss reserves and quality of loan underwriting. Id.
at 97,842. The court stated:

Feeks was ... the President of the Bank's Community Bank Group and as such oversaw
and was actively supported by the Bank's commercial real estate division. As alleged in
the complaint, the Bank's commercial real estate division and the loans within the
commercial real estate lending portfolios were a primary source of the falsity of defendants' overstatements of the Bank's earnings, income and net assets by the understatement of its loan loss provisions and non-performing assets.
Id. The court went on to write:

In the Bank's 1987 and 1988 Annual Reports, defendant Feeks is prominently listed as
the second-ranking officer of the Bank.... As such, all statements of the Bank concerning, inter alia, the adequacy of its loan loss reserves, its 'high-quality' loan portfolio ...
are also properly attributed to Fceks as the second-ranking officer of the Bank.
Id.

104. See Neubauer v. Eva-Health USA, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 281, 283, 284 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)

(" [P] osition as corporate secretary is sufficient to link [defendant] to the offering memorandum under Luce." Although this defendant had the same last name as the chairman/CEO
and allegedly resided at the same address, the court appeared to give these facts small consideration, saying, in the context of analyzing "control person" allegations that "[g]iven the
infinite variations in human relationships, her place of residence adds nothing of significance
.... "). See also Klein v. Goetzmann, 770 E Supp. 78, 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding defendants
not included within "group" by virtue of membership on board or Audit Committee, but
"[t]he allegation that defendant Smith was secretary of the corporation is sufficient ... to
bring him within the Second Circuit's 'group pleading' rule .... ").
105. See In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
("[T]he group pleading presumption applies to Hirsh and Myers. Hirsh and Myers are
alleged to have been officers of Health Management or of its wholly owned subsidiary. Myers
is alleged to have been Health Management's Vice President for Program Development.
Hirsh is aJleged to have been Vice President for Purchasing and Managed Care Contracts
at HMI Pennsylvania. Although Hirsh and Myers may not have been top level officers of
Health Management, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have alleged that they were 'insiders,'
falling within the group pleading presumption."). But, note also that in this case plaintiffs
alleged specific involvement by each of these two defendants in identified wrongdoing. One
of them was allegedly present at the meeting during which an "in transit" inventory scheme
was devised; the other allegedly prepared false paperwork to document an inventory transfer
that had not occurred.
106. For instance in Brickman v. Tyco Toys, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), an
individual defendant was not an insider where he did not join the board until after the class
period, despite allegations that he controlled the issuer's directors. See id. at I 061. The court
reasoned:
although the amended complaint describes [this defendant] as "an insider," he did not
become a ... director until three months after the end of the proposed class period,
and plaintiff concedes that, prior to attaining that position, this defendant had not had
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TO WHAT COMMUNICATIONS DOES THE LUCE
EXCEPTION APPLY WHEN A CORPORATION IS THE
ISSUER?
Although the trio of limited partnership opinions authored by the Second Circuit dealt with offering documents, and although some lower court
decisions in the corporate context so limited "group pleading" when a
corporation was the issuer, 107 that limitation has not prevailed.108 Indeed,
such a limitation seemed likely to fail in a corporate setting given that Luce
cited Somerville and Pellman with approval, and those decisions applied the
pleading exception to annual reports, published financials, and proxy statements.109 Subsequent opinions in the Second Circuit apply "group pleading" in a corporate setting to those documents as well as press releases
and SEC filings.110 At least one case extends the concept to tender offer
documents, 111 another applies it to an acquisition agreement in a sale of
"any previous official involvement in [the issuer's] affairs .... "Moreover, the term "insider" is conclusory and inexact. Plaintiff must define the type of conduct engaged in
which renders each defendant liable for the misrepresentation at issue.

Id. (citation omitted).
I 07. See Pallickal v. Technology Intern., Ltd., No. 94CIV.5 738 (DC), 1996 WL 153699,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 3, 1996) (granting motion to dismiss by President/ director of issuer and
noting, "[t]he amended complaint does not allege that there was an offering memorandum.
Thus, plaintiffs were required to allege facts specifically pertaining to [this defendant].");
Nein, 770 F. Supp. at 81 ("[I]his 'group pleading,' however, is limited to situations where
the alleged misrepresentations are contained in an offering memorandum .... ").
108. See, e.g., Axe!Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 847 F. Supp. 317, 321 (S.D.N.Y
1994) (applying Luce to annual financial statements of a corporation, whose stock was purchased by another company and finding defendant "has not suggested a rational basis for
distinguishing an offering memorandum from other materials issued by the seller and foreseeably relied on by the buyer to put this case outside of the Luce rule").
109. See text accompanying supra notes 69-73.
110. See generally Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989) (annual report, 10-Ks, and
press releases); Furman v. Sherwood, 833 F. Supp. 408, 417 n.6 (S.D.N.Y 1993) ("In cases
like the one at bar, where the alleged false and misleading statements were made in [the
issuer's] annual report and Company press releases, no such connection [between an individual defendant and the fraud] need be pied because such documents are presumed to entail
the collective actions of the directors and officers."); Nicholas v. Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank/
FSB, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) iJ 95,606 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 26,
1990) (proxy statements and annual reports); Runes v. Gridcomm, Inc., No. B-86-473TFGD, 1990 WL 483735 (D. Conn.Jan. 3, 1990) (SEC filings and press releases); Quantum
Overseas, N.V. v. Touche Ross & Co., 663 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y 1987) (SEC filings).
111. See Polar Int'! Brokerage Corp. v. Reeve, 108 F. Supp. 2d 225, 238 (S.D.N.Y 2000)
("With respect to Trinity, KKR, the Individual Defendants and the Investment Bank Defendants, ... group pleading tactics are appropriate. As demonstrated by the Offer Documents
themselves, all of these defendants were intimately involved both in negotiating the Offer
and in drafting the allegedly fraudulent Solicitation and Tender Offer Statement. For example, the Solicitation-which was issued on behalf of Trinity, Willis Corroon and KKRincludes letters to Willis Corroon shareholders from five of the Individual Defendants and
all of the Investment Bank Defendants.").
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assets for stock, 11 2 and yet another appears to employ "group pleading"
to deny a 9(b) motion where the misrepresentations allegedly occurred in
letters relating to the purchase of stock from minority shareholders. 113
The Second Circuit formula-sweeping in "insiders and affiliates"focuses less on whether a defendant actually prepared the misstatement
than on his or her relationship to the offending entity or the transaction
in which the misstatement occurred. Perhaps for this reason, district court
opm1ons are inconsistent in their application of group pleading to oral
statements. 114 One decision even suggests that a letter to shareholders
112. In Nationwide Cellular Service, Inc. v. American Mobile Communications, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 96,435 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 29, 1991), AMC sold assets to
Nationwide for stock. Nationwide sued for fraud, naming AMC shareholders in the suit. The
court summarized the allegations as charging that
the AMC shareholders were all parties to the [Asset Acquisition Agreement], and ...
that the AMC Shareholders collectively owned over 90% of the issued and outstanding
common stock of AMC; each of the individual AMC Shareholders was an officer and/
or director of AMC; and each ... actively participated, either directly or through agents,
in the negotiation and consummation of the transaction ....

Id. at 91,890 n.5 (citation omitted). The court then found that group pleading against these
defendants was permissible and noted that "the majority of the misrepresentations Nationwide alleges are contained in either the June 1989 financial statements, upon which the Assets
Acquisition Agreement was predicated, or in the Agreement itself." Id. at 91,890. See also
Elliot Assocs., L.P. v. Hayes, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 91,283, at 95,593
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2000) (finding "Operative Documents" to be "group-published" and
defining Operative Documents to be a Certificate of Designations for preferred stock, a
Preferred Stock Investment Agreement, and a Registration Rights Agreement (id. at 95,589)).
113. See Aquilio v. Manaker, Nos. 90-CV-45, 91-CV-93, 1991 WL 207473, at *12
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1991) (discussing application of Rule 9(b) to common law fraud claim,
and characterizing complaint as alleging that the "letters [were] condoned by all defendants
in their capacities [as] members of the SAA board"; providing "cf" citation to "group pleading" case), on reconsideration ef other issues, 1992 WL 144303 (N.D.N.Y. June 19, 1992).
114. Several courts have declined to apply "group pleading" to oral statements: Elliot
Assocs., L.P. v. Covance, Inc. [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 91,269, at 95,489
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2000) ("To allow group pleading in the context of oral statements would
unduly expand its ambit beyond that contemplated by the Second Circuit when it adopted
the theory."); Neubauer v. Eva-Health USA, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 281, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(applying Luce to alleged misrepresentations in offering memorandum, but separately analyzing oral misrepresentation claims and dismissing them in part because plaintiffs failed to
allege "by whom" they were made); In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1252,
1261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), eff'd in part and rev'd in part (on other grounds), 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir.
1993) ("The specificity requirements for pleading actionable statements are relaxed in the
case of offering memoranda because they are documents of vital importance to any issuing
company, and accordingly can be presumed to result from collaborative effort by senior
officers of a defendant corporation. The statements in question here, by contrast, were alleged
to have been uttered by unnamed spokespersons or even more shadowy figures who are not
shown to have been known to defendants, and who, from the pleadings, cannot be said to
have been within the defendants' control when they made the alleged statements."); Ohman
v. Kahn, 685 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding alleged misrepresentations in
telephone call and face-to-face meetings "do not involve the preparation of corporate doc-
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specifically attributed to a single, indentified defendant might be subject
to the pleading shortcut.115

ABUSE OF THE PLEADING PROTOCOL
As the development of "group pleading" in the Ninth and Second Circuit demonstrates, this protocol is a judicially created pleading presumption to permit plaintiffs to name defendants without honoring the otherwise applicable requirement that no defendant should be named in a fraud

uments by insiders which can obviate the need for particularizing among the defendants. As
a result [these allegations] must be repleaded to specify the speaker, the approximate time of
communication and the content of the communication."). Several decisions appear to have
permitted "group pleading" where oral statements were involved, albeit without analyzing
the difficulties of applying that concept when defendants speak rather than write: Cosmas,
886 F.2d at 10 (alleged misstatement made by CEO in magazine interview); Benedict v.
Amaducci, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,830, at 93,010 (S.D.N.Y.
July 11, 1995) (explaining the reach of Luce and citing Cosmas: "courts have sustained a finding
of fraud against all the directors of a corporation for statements made by the corporation in
public filings and by a sole director in a magazine article."); In re AnnTaylor Stores Sec.
Litig., 807 F. Supp. 990, 996, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying motions to dismiss where one
of the aftermarket statements was made by "an AnnTaylor spokesperson" who said that the
company was "comfortable" with an analyst earnings estimate, and writing that the individual defendants, "each of whom is alleged to have been aware of the dissemination and content
of the allegedly fraudulent after-market statements through press releases and the media,
need not be directly responsible for making each of the misstatements during the Class Period
in order to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b)."). In Mann v. Levy, 776 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y.
1991 ), defendant Levy was identified as an officer and director of the issuer as well as a
lawyer who represented the issuer and its president in connection with the private stock
transaction in this case. He argued that the complaint failed to attribute any of the alleged
false statements directly to him-the fraud was failure to reveal $2 million in returned merchandise. Levy had attended meetings where oral representations were made to plaintiff that
the issuer had "great potential," had "turned the corner," was a "terrific company," had
been in contact with additional investors prepared to infuse capital, and had initiated negotiations with a factor to provide cash flow. Levy participated in the telephone call to
persuade plaintiffs to buy company notes that were in default, and he was also present at a
meeting with the president, the factor, and plaintiff at which the factor stated that it was
prepared to resume the factoring agreement. The court held:
Where, as here, plaintiff alleges with particularity the content of the statements sued
upon, the time and place at which they were made, and the fact that the speaker was
one of at most five persons-all of whom are allegedly officers and directors of [the
issuer] (or a single representative of its factor)-we find the requirements of Rule 9(b)
have been met.
Id. at 813 (citing Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986)).
115. See Nicholas, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 95,606. The
complaint included an allegation that a letter written by defendant Kinkade was misleading
and, although the opinion is not entirely clear, the statements in it were among those apparently attributed to defendant Feeks. Id. at 97,838, 97,842. The decision does not address
the conceptual difficulties of applying group pleading to statements expressly attributed to
one defendant.
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case without specifically alleging that defendant's role in the fraud. 116 By
their terms, W&ol and Luce addressed a pleading question. 117
Some decisions, however, either misunderstand the "group pleading"
concept or wrongly expand upon it, (i) by apparently transmuting it into
a rule of substantive law applicable on summary judgment motions; 118
(ii) by converting this pleading presumption into a rebuttable evidentiary
presumption; I 19 or (iii) by allowing plaintiffs to continue to rely on "group
116. Decisions from both circuits recognize that "group pleading" is an exception to the
otherwise applicable requirements of Rule 9(b). See, e.g., In re Oak Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 9620552 SW, 1997 WL 448168, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. l, 1997) ("Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff
to attribute fraudulent acts or statements to a particular defendant. However, the Ninth
Circuit has recognized an exception to this rule .... ") (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers
Cnc., 818 E2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987)) (additional citation omitted); Rubin v. Trimble,
No. C-95-4353 MMC, 1997 WL 227956, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1997) ("Under Rule
9(b), plaintif!S generally must attribute each fraudulent statement or act to a particular defendant. An exception to this rule is the 'group pleading' doctrine, under which plaintiffs
need not identify each corporate officer or director who participated in drafting grouppublished information such a prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports and press
releases.") (citing Jn re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 E3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1995) and Wool,
818 E2d at 1440) (additional citation omitted); ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay
Int'l Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '!199,345, at 96, l 00
(S.D.N.Y Jan. 22, 1997) (referencing "the Luce exception to the general rule that fraud
allegations against multiple defendants must identify each defendant with each act alleged
against it"); Parnes v. Mast Property Investors, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 792, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
("As a general rule, plaintif!S claiming fraud must draw a specific connection between the
allegedly fraudulent statements and each defendant .... However, an exception to that rule
is made where, as here, plaintiff alleges that an offering memorandum was fraudulent and
defendants are insiders or affiliates who participated in the offer of the securities.") (citing
Luce, 802 E2d at 55).
117. The Wool discussion that concludes with the "group publication" language is titled
"Rule 9(b) Motion." At its outset, it identifies the issue as a pleading question:
The individual defendants contended, and the district court concluded, that Wool's
allegations against the individual defendants failed to satisfy the particularity requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) .... [llhe individual defendants argued that the allegations
in W'ool's complaint were insufficient against them because: ... the activities of each of
the individual defendants were not separately and specifically identified.
818 F.2d at 1439.
Similarly, the "group pleading" language in Luce lies under the heading "Sufficiency of
the Complaint," discusses Rule 9(b) explicitly and responds to the district court's dismissal
of the complaint on the basis that it "fail [ed] to connect allegations of fraudulent representations to particular defendants." 802 F.2d at 54.
118. See Golden v. Terre Linda Corp., No. 95C065 7, 1996 WL 426760, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
July 26, 1996) (relying on Blake v. Dierdor!T, 856 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988), and denying
motion for summary judgment by Chairman of the Board/Secretary on l O(b) claim; using
"group pleading" authority to attribute to the moving defendant an allegedly false and misleading representation that the corporation's stock would be registered, a representation
made in a letter signed by a vice president).
119. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 E Supp. 746, 759-60 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(granting summary judgment as to some defendants and stating, " [u] nder the group pleading
doctrine, in drafting a complaint, plaintiffs may rely on a presumption that statements in
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pleading" after they have had discovery. 120 Better-reasoned cases are clear
that "group published information is designed only to be a pleading device
[rather than] ... a hook on which to hang liability" 12 1 and that plaintiffs
must identify "statements made by ... individuals personally in order to
survive summary judgment."122
A handful of opinions make a second mistake by extending "group
pleading" to scienter. 123 This confuses two questions: (i) what allegations
'prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports, press releases, or other 'group published information," are the collective work of those individuals with direct involvement in
the day-to-day affairs of the company. This presumption is rebuttable, however. On summary
judgment, a defendant may rebut the group pleading presumption by producing evidence
that he had no involvement in creating the challenged document .... All four defendants
aver that they were not involved in preparing or disseminating any of the class period documents. All four defendants also aver that they did not make any of the alleged false and
misleading statements of October 19, 1995 and November 2, 1995. Defendant Ramsay was
on sabbatical and vacation on those dates, and defendant Sekimoto, who resides in Japan,
was not present either. Defendants Baskett and Burgess did not participate in the October
19th conference call, and although they were present at the November 2nd meeting with
analysts, their presentations did not involve financial forecasting, sales, or (the product involved in the case).") (citations omitted). See also In re 3Com Sec. Litig., 761 F. Supp. 1411,
1414-15 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss where defendants argued that many
challenged statements were "attributable only to Mr. Krause," on the basis that the group
publication "presumption may be rebutted by a later showing that defendant Krause's statements did not reflect the collective actions of the other defendants.").
120. See In re Wall Data Sec. Litig., (1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'IJ 99,292, at 95,747-48 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 1996) (rejecting argument on motion to
dismiss Second Amended Complaint that, in light of substantial discovery, court should revisit
"group pleading" and hold plaintiffs to a higher standard for allegations against individual
defendants).
121. In re Interactive Network, Inc. Sec. Litig., 948 F. Supp. 917, 922 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
122. Schlagel v. Learning Tree, Int'!, (1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'IJ 90,403, at 91,816 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1998).
123. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 995 (E.D. Mo.
1999) (relying on "group pleading" to attribute knowledge to defendants to satisfy a negligence standard for section 14 claims and scienter requirement for IO(b) claims and stating,
"The group pleading doctrine ... attributes knowledge of this information to all officers and
directors with inside information of or involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the corporation."); In re Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., 767 F. Supp. 275, 282 (D.D.C. 1991) (referencing group published information authorities in scienter discussion). Other cases, which
are more properly characterized as "group scienter" cases, hold on the basis of related but
separate reasoning that scienter may be pleaded by group allegations. These cases reason
that some information is so important to a corporation that it is presumably known by officers
or directors. For example, in Epstein v. Itron, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Wash. 1998), the
court found, "facts critical to a business's core operations or an important transaction generally are so apparent that their knowledge may be attributed to the company and its key
officers." Id. at 1326. Epstein cites Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989), for this proposition. But the Cosmas discussion of this matter, under the "Scienter" heading, id. at 12-13,
is separate from the discussion of particularity in identifying which defendants were responsible for particular misstatements, id. at 11-12. This Article will not address these "group
scienter" cases, except to note that they seem contrary to the direction that, in private actions
for damages under lO(b), the plaintiff must plead "with particularity facts giving rise to a
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are sufficient to hold defendants responsible for making a statement (which
"group pleading" does address); and (ii) what allegations are sufficient to
plead defendants' knowledge that the statement is false (which "group
pleading" does not address). Most decisions considering this matter have
correctly held that the two questions are separate. l 24

THE EFFECT OF CENTRAL BANK
Turning from the elaboration of "group pleading" and its proper use
to whether it should be employed at all, there are three issues: (i) whether
such pleading is consistent with the post-Central Bank focus on primary liability; (ii) whether "group pleading" survives the PSLRA; and
(iii) whether the assumptions underlying the pleading protocol reflect the
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). It is hard to see how a general allegation that a matter was
important to a company's overall business states particular facts providing a strong inference
that a certain defendant knew a specific fact and considered it material.
124. In Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986), the complaint was based largely on
allegations that the defendants made specific promises to induce the securities transactions
while secretly intending not to carry them out or knowing that they could not be carried out.
In remanding with the direction that plaintiffs should be permitted to amend, the court stated
that amendments "relating to projections or expectations offered to induce investments must
allege particular facts demonstrating the knowledge of defendants at the time that such
statements were false." Id. at 5 7. See also Jacobs v. Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.P., [1999 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,443, at 92,036-37 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1999) ("Plaintiffs
argue that Hirsch should be charged with knowledge of the material misstatements contained
in Happiness's 1995 financial disclosure documents under the 'group pleading doctrine,'
embraced by the Second Circuit .... However, even under the group pleading doctrine, a
complaint must allege that the defendants are 'insiders or affiliates' and must allege 'particular
facts demonstrating the knowledge of each of the defendants at the time that the statements
were false.' ... [I]he Second Amended Complaint alleges no facts other than that Hirsch
was a director, a member of the audit committee, and a signatory of the 10-K form; it does
not allege facts demonstrating that Hirsch knew at the time that the statements were false.")
(citation omitted); ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'! Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 99,345, at 96, I 00 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1996) ("ESl's
complaint must satisfy the two requirements of the Luce exception: (I) that the defendants
are insiders or affiliates participating in the offer of the securities in question ... ; and,
(2) that the complaint alleges particular facts demonstrating the knowledge of defendants at
the time that the statements were false .... ");Ackerman v. National Property Analysts, Inc.,
887 F. Supp. 494, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (" [I]he Luce exception does not relieve a plaintiff from
properly pleading allegations which demonstrate that each defendant knew or had reason to
know of the false statements and material omissions in the offering material."). See also In re
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 190 F.R.D. 331, 336 (D.N.J. 1999) (granting outside director
motion to dismiss common law fraud count, and stating, "[b]ecause of their 'group pleading'
approach, the plaintiffs have failed to allege that even one of the CUC outside directors was
actually aware of any accounting irregularities."); In re The First Union Corp. Sec. Litig.,
128 F. Supp. 2d 871, 888 (W.D.N.C. 2001) (rejecting plaintiffs' effort to use group pleading
to avoid specifically alleging scienter and finding "contrary even to pre-Reform Act law" the
view that "because of their positions as corporate officers, defendants must have known of
allegedly false and misleading nature of all the alleged misstatements").
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reality of corporate life. This section addresses Central Bank and primary
liability. The next two sections discuss the two remaining questions.
In Central Bank efDenver v. First Interstate, I 25 the Supreme Court ruled that
there is no aiding and abetting liability in private lOb-5 actions.126 The
Second and Ninth Circuits have held that Central Bank's rationale precludes
conspiracy liability as well. 127 Because Central Bank seems to contract the
circle of possible securities law defendants and because "group pleading"
permits plaintiffs to place defendants within the circle at least for purposes
of a complaint, it is important to consider whether Central Bank affects the
"group pleading" authorities.
Few courts have directly considered this question. Several have held that
Central Bank does not affect "group pleading." 128 They have done so in
part on the basis that Central Bank announces a substantive rule while f!l.iJol
and Luce address only pleading, 129 in part on the basis that "group pleading" is used against defendants sued as primary violators rather than as
aiders or abettors or conspirators, 130 and in part because the Supreme
Court acknowledged in Central Bank that:
125. 511 U.S.164(1994).
126. Id. at 191.
127. See Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837, 838
(2d Cir. 1998); In re GlenFed, Inc., 60 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1995).
128. See, e.g., In re American Bank Note Holographies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 424,
442 (S.D.N.Y 2000) ("While it is true that there can be no aider and abettor liability under
IO(b) ... , grouping defendants together in the complaint does not in itself make the allegations defective. It is well settled that plaintiffs may engage in so-called group-pleading under
IO(b) ... .");In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1999); In re
Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (relying on In re Health
Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 208-09 (E.D.N.Y 1997)); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 99,325, at 95,963
n.5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); McDaid v. Sanders, No. C-95-20750, 1996 WL 241605, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996). See also Copperstone v. TCSI Corp., No. C97-3495SBA, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *52-*53 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 14, 1999) (noting argument by defendants, to whom no statements were attributed, that Central Bank required their dismissal and
stating immediately that "the Ninth Circuit recognizes the 'group published information'
doctrine").
129. See Silicon Graphics, Inc., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
95,963 n.5 ("Central Bank does not prohibit group pleading, it merely prohibits a private right
of action for aiding and abetting liability."); McDaid, 1996 WL 241605, at *2 (same); In re
MTG Electronic Techns. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 980-81 (E.D.N.Y 1995)
("Even assuming arguendo that [after Central Bank] a corporate insider must be personally
responsible for a particular misstatement ... in order to be primarily liable ... there is no
reason to conclude that such responsibility must be specifically alleged in the complaint.
Indeed, the rationale for the relaxed pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) suggests
otherwise.").
130. See O~rd Health Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. at 142 ("Although the Supreme Court has
eliminated secondary liability for aiders and abettors ... primary liability under Rule I Ob-5
may be imposed 'not only on persons who made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on
those who had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its perpetration."') (quoting S.E.C. v.
FirstJersey Sec., Inc., IOI F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Azrielli v. Cohen Law
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The absence of § 1O(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from
liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity ... who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or a seller of securities relies may be
liable as a primary violator under 1Ob-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability ... are met. In any complex securities
fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators. I 3 I
The decisions dismissing Central Bank's effect on "group pleading" are
too hasty. True enough, Central Bank is substantive rather than procedural
and eliminates aiding and abetting liability without defining primary liability. The Supreme Court's decision, however, makes the definition of
primary liability important. 132 Before Central Bank, adding a defendant as
an alleged primary violator-by "group pleading" or otherwise-was often of little significance. If the defendant was not a primary violator, he or
she might well be an aider and abettor or a co-conspirator. If plaintiffs
erroneously identified the defendant as a primary violator, it might be a
case of "no harm, no foul." After Central Bank, this is no longer true, and
a defendant wrongly added as a primary violator might well not be a
proper defendant under any theory and therefore altogether wrongly
sued. 133
Precisely because the definition of a primary violation has assumed
greater importance after Central Bank, courts have devoted more attention
to the issue. Although not in agreement with each other, the circuits have
sharpened their definitions. This has critical importance for "group pleading." Although only a procedural protocol, the purpose of "group pleading" is to permit plaintiffs to name at the outset of a case defendants whose
precise roles plaintiffs will not know until discovery, but who, because of
Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1994)); Sunbeam, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 ("[I]n no way does
[Central Bank] restrict the ability of a plaintiff to allege primary violations of SectionlO(b)
against groups of defendants.").
131. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191, quoted in part in Sunbeam, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
132. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 71 7, 721 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997) ("In pre-Central Bank
cases, some courts did not distinguish precisely between primary liability and aiding and
abetting liability."). See also Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 n.8 (10th
Cir. 1996) ("Commentators have long recognized the vagaries in the borders between primary and secondary liability.... Central Bank ef Denver requires courts to delineate primary
liability much more clearly.") (citation omitted).
133. Aside from "control person" liability, it may be that plaintiffs cannot now name in
a private IO(b) action any defendant who is not a primary violator. See Powers v. Eichen, 977
F. Supp I 031, I 040 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that after Central Bank, "only primary participants
in a section l O(b) violation may be held liable"); Silicon Graphics, Inc. [1996-1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,96 l (same). See also Arduini/Messina Partnership v.
National Med. Fin. Servs. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 352, 362 (S.D.N.Y 1999) ("[T]he only form
of [section] IO(b) liability that remains viable [after Central Bank] is primary liability."); Rubinstein v. Skyteller, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 315, 322 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (same).
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their positions, are so likely to be proper defendants that plaintiffs appropriately name them without pleading specific facts tying them to the fraud.
Because, after Central Bank, defendants are named as primary violators,
"group pleading" presumes that the facts will show each of these defendants
to have played a primary violator's role. Accordingly, the criteria for including a defendant through "group pleading" should be good predictors
ofa primary violator role and must be evaluated by the criteria's predictive
power for that purpose. Such an evaluation, in turn, begins with the definition of a primary violation.
In formulating that definition, some cases take an expansive view, and
include as primary violators all those who participated in the preparation
of a challenged statement. Others restrict primary liability to those who
in fact wrote or spoke the offending words or numbers or to whom those
words or numbers were specifically attributed. 13 4 If "group pleading" rules
include within the "group" defendants who are unlikely to be primary
violators under a particular circuit's definition of primary liability, then
that circuit must either change the rules identifying the "group" or abandon "group pleading" altogether. With that in mind, this Article will now
compare primary liability law to "group pleading" rules in the Ninth and
Second Circuits.

THE NINFH CIRCUIT: CENTRAL BANK LIKELY HAS A
LIMITED EFFECT ON GROUP PLEADING
In re Seftware Toolworks Inc. Securities Litigation 135 contains the most frequently quoted Ninth Circuit comment on primary liability. That decision
reversed summary judgment granted to accountants. 136 Plaintiffs contended that the accounting firm violated section I O(b) by "participating in
drafting ... two letters that Toolworks sent to the SEC ... [that] falsely
stated that Toolworks did not have preliminary financial data available for
the June quarter and misleadingly described the nature of Toolworks'
134. See McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 5 7 E Supp. 2d 396, 429-30 (E.D. Tex. 1999)
(noting that plaintiffs placed the decisions on primary liability in two categories, one promoting "a 'bright line' test, under which liability attache[s] only if the defendant itself made
an allegedly false or misleading statement[,]" and the other advocating a test under which
"a defendant [who] played a 'significant role' in preparing a false statement" would also be
primarily liable), motion.for reconsideration on other matters denied, 68 E Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Tex.
1999); MTG Elec. 1echs., 898 E Supp. at 986 (''./\t first blush, these cases seem to suggest two
distinct approaches. On the one hand, some courts have adopted a bright line rule: if the
defendant did not actually make the alleged misleading statement, it cannot be primarily
liable no matter how much assistance the defendant may have rendered to those who did.
On the other hand, some courts have adopted a rule that focuses on the degree of help
rendered, holding that a defendant may be found primarily liable for statements of others in
which the defendant substantially participated. Upon close scrutiny, however, these different
approaches start to blur.").
135. 50 E3d 615 (9th Cir. 1995).
136. Id. at 629.
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OEM contracts." 137 In granting judgment to the accountants, the district
court had analyzed whether they had aided and abetted a IO(b) violation
by Toolworks. By the time the Ninth Circuit decided the case, the Supreme
Court had published Central Bank. The court of appeals therefore considered whether the accountants could be primarily liable:
Despite Central Bank, we nevertheless consider this issue because the
plaintiffs' complaint clearly alleges that Deloitte is primarily liable
under section 1O(b) for the SEC letters. In fact, the July 1 SEC letter
stated that it "was prepared after extensive review and discussions
with ... Deloitte" and actually referred the SEC to two Deloitte
partners for further information. Similarly, the plaintiffs presented
evidence that Deloitte played a significant role in drafting and editing
the July 4 SEC letter. This evidence is sufficient to sustain a primary
cause of action under section 1O(b) and, as a result, Central Bank does
not absolve Deloitte on these issues. 138
More recently, the Ninth Circuit reversed a judgment as a matter oflaw
that a trial court entered in favor ofa CEO/Board Chairman. 139 The trial
court reasoned that "because [this defendant] did not participate in the
drafting of the allegedly false financial statements, he did not make a statement within the meaning of [section] IO(b)." 140 The CEO/Chairman,
however, had signed SEC filings containing the financials, and the Ninth
Circuit held that "[b]ecause [this defendant] signed the statements alleged
to be false, the district court erred in making the blanket holding that [he]
could not be a primary violator .... " 141 The court of appeals concluded
that "when a corporate officer signs a document on behalf of the corporation, that signature will be rendered meaningless unless the officer
believes that the statements in the document are true." 14 2 In reaching
its decision, the Ninth Circuit summarized Seflware Toolworks as holding
137. Id. at 628.
138. Id. at n.3 (citations omitted).
139. Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 105 7, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1063.
142. Id. at 1061. It is difficult to determine what the Everex decision means for outside
directors. The opinion focuses on a CEO, repeatedly refers to "corporate officers" and
distinguishes some of the cases cited by the defendant as ones in which "the defendant was
an outside director." Id. at 1062. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit cites to and quotes
from In re ]WP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y 1996), which held that audit
committee members could be primarily liable for statements in SEC filings that they signed.
The Ninth Circuit also recognizes that any defendant may be primarily liable for misstatements or omissions in a document that it authors itself. See McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102
F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that an accounting firm might be liable for an allegedly
false and misleading audit opinion that it knows will be included in a 10-K); Knapp v. Ernst
& Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (accounting firm could be primarily liable
for failure to include a going concern qualification in audit opinion).
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"that substantial participation or intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent statements is grounds for primary liability even though
that participation might not lead to the actor's actual making of the
statements." 143
In other decisions addressing primary liability, district courts in the
Ninth Circuit have: (i) denied summary judgment to accountants for misrepresentations made in issuer press releases because of "a disputed issue
of fact as to whether [the accountants] actively participated in the preparation, review or release" of those publications; 144 (ii) denied a motion to
dismiss brought by "attorneys [who allegedly] drafted the prospectus
which contained misrepresentations and omissions";1 45 (iii) denied summary judgment to nonmanaging underwriters who "played little or no
direct role in preparing the ... prospectus, or completing the primary due
diligence investigation" but whose "names appeared on the final prospectus";146 (iv) denied a motion to dismiss by a financial advisor who allegedly
prepared an Information Circular to solicit shareholder approval of a
merger and a Term Sheet used to sell debentures; 14 7 (v) denied a motion
by an underwriter for summary judgment on misleading statements in a
prospectus because its "participation in both drafting and decision-making
[was] sufficient to establish a triable primary liability claim under [section]
1O(b)"; 148 and (vi) denied motions to dismiss by three individuals who
allegedly provided the false and misleading information about their company that was used in a press release by a merger partner and a solicitation
to the merger partner's shareholders.149 On the other hand, the courts
have granted a motion by an outside director to dismiss a primary liability
claim because there was no allegation that he was "a substantial participant in a fraud perpetrated by others"1 5o and granted a motion for summary judgment to executives who submitted uncontested declarations that

143. Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 n.5.
144. In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 968-72 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
145. Employer Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381, 388-89
(S.D. Cal. 1994), order on reconsideration ef other matters, 948 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
146. Jn re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'If 98,485, at 91,312-13 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1994) ("While it may be true they made no
contribution to the preparation of the prospectus itself, the document as it was publicly
disseminated had their name on it and gave no indication that it was not as much the product
of the [nonmanaging underwriters) as it was of the managing underwriter.").
14 7. Trafton v. Deacon Barclays De Zoete Wedd Ltd., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'If 98,481, at 91,281 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1994).
148. Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'If 99,436, at 96,862-63 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 1997) (noting also the underwriters' "roles as
analysts, investment bankers and business advisors with extensive contacts with [issuer) defendants [and) superior access to non-public information").
149. Trefion, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] F. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,295.
150. In re Medeva Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'If 98,323, at 90,241 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1994).
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they had nothing to do with the company statements that the plaintiffs
challenged. 151
Some of the Ninth Circuit district court opinions unquestionably go too
far and include as primary violators defendants who do not qualify for
primary liability even under the Sqflware Toolworks "significant role in drafting and editing" formula. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit definition itself is
too broad, and does not respect the Supreme Court's abolition of aiding
and abetting liability. This Article, however, will not address that question.
Whether misguided or not, the breadth of the Ninth Circuit test for primary liability combined with its relatively narrow "group pleading" rule
suggests that the two concepts generally do not war with one another. If
a defendant really was a part of what U'<Jol described as a narrow group
of individuals who had a direct involvement in preparing the offending
document, then the defendant may well meet the test of playing the significant role in drafting and editing that apparently suffices under Sqflware
Toolworks for a primary violation.
One aspect of Ninth Circuit "group pleading" law, however, is at odds
with that circuit's primary liability decisions. GlenFed introduced the "dayto-day" involvement test to determine whether outside directors would be
within the publishing "group." The Moore decision and various district
court opinions then employed that same test to determine whether certain
other defendants were within the "group." 15 2 A defendant can be included
within a "group" under this test, however, if that defendant, in GlenFed's
words, "participated in the day-to-day corporate activities" 15 3 or, in Moore's
words, "had day-to-day control over the fraudulent entit[y]." 154 By the
terms of these tests, general involvement in "day-to-day" activities may
suffice. Primary 1O(b) liability under Sqflware Toolworks, however, hinges on
whether the defendant played a significant role in drafting or editing the
particular statement that is misleading, not whether the defendant played
some other role in the corporation-even if that other role was so regular
as to be "daily." 155 The "day-to-day" involvement test for "group pleading" is out of sync with the Ninth Circuit's definition of primary liability.
151. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) "ii 99,325, at 95,963 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996). See also Binder v. Gillespie,
184 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for an accounting firm
on the basis that its participation in the preparation of unaudited quarterly reports was
insufficient where deposition testimony showed that the accountants had "commented" on
the quarterlies but had not been engaged to "review" them), cert. denied sub nom., Binder v.
Wilson, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000).
152. See supra notes 21-22, 33-36, and accompanying text.
153. In re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1998). Oddly, GlenFed announces this standard in the context of a primary liability and "control person" discussion,
but does not address how members of a "group" could, simply by participating in some dayto-day corporate activities, become primarily liable for a particular misleading document.
154. Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989).
155. In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994).
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THE SECOND CIRCUIT: CENTRAL BANK SHOULD LEAD
TO A MASSIVE OVERHAUL OF GROUP PLEADING LAW OR
AN ABOLITION OF GROUP PLEADING ALTOGETHER
Shapiro v. Cantorl56 and Wright v. Ernst & Young UPl57 are arguably the
two most important Second Circuit decisions addressing primary liability.
Shapiro held that accountants whose only specifically alleged role was preparation of projections attached to offering memoranda could not be primarily liable for the memoranda's failure to disclose that one of the partnerships' principals was a convicted felon. 158 Shapiro quoted from an
opinion in the MTG Electronics litigation in which the district court concluded:
[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually
make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under
Section lO(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and
abetting, and no matter how substantial that aid may be, it is not
enough to trigger liability under Section lO(b).159

Shapiro also quoted from the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anixter v. HomeStake Products Co., which reasoned that "in order for accountants to 'use or
employ' a 'deception' actionable under the antifraud law, they must themselves make a false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know
or should know will reach potential investors." 160 Speaking more generally,
the Second Circuit wrote that a "claim under§ lO(b) must allege a defendant has made a material misstatement or omission .... "161
Wright held that an auditor could not be primarily liable for an issuer's
publication of financial results where the press release did not mention the
auditor and expressly stated that the release contained "unaudited" figures.162 The Second Circuit so decided even though plaintiffs alleged that
the accountants had "signed ofY' on the numbers "with full knowledge of
the fact that the market would and did interpret the release of these figures
as having been approved by [the auditor]." 163 After again quoting from
the lower court MTG Electronics decision, Wright held that:
a secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the Act for a
statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination.
Such a holding would circumvent the reliance requirements of the
156. 123 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1997).
15 7. 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999).
158. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 721.
159. Id. at 720 (quoting In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974,
987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
160. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720 (quoting Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226).
161. /d.at720-21.
162. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1104 (1999).
163. Id. at 172.
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Act .... Thus, the misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor at the time of public dissemination, that is, in advance of
the investment decision.164
If these two decisions were the universe, the Second Circuit rule would
be clear. To be primarily liable under section lO(b), a defendant must
actually make the challenged misstatement. Where the defendant is a "secondary actor" such as an accountant, and the misstatement is distributed
by others, the misstatement must be specifically attributed to the secondary
actor.
This clear picture, however, is clouded by two other Second Circuit
opinions: SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc. 16 5 and SEC v. US. Environmental,
Inc.166 First Jersey Securities was a broker-dealer with branch offices
throughout the United States. Its sales force frequently sold "units" combining shares of common stock with warrants. The sales force would recommend that purchasers of the "units" sell them back to First Jersey at a
slight profit. Firstjersey would then split the stock from the warrants and
sell these components separately to different customers through different
branches for significantly more than the price at which it had repurchased
the units. The effect was to charge an excessive markup to the purchasers
of the unbundled unit components.
The SEC sued not only Firstjersey but also Robert Brennan. Brennan
was a director and the one hundred percent owner ofFirstJersey. He was
at one time its president and later became its chairman and Chief Executive Officer. He "was intimately involved in the operations ofFirstJersey,
including all significant decisions regarding the firm's underwriting, retail
sales and trading activities." 167 The evidence at trial sufficed to show that
he "had knowledge of First Jersey's frauds and participated in the fraudulent scheme." 168 Pointing to findings that "Brennan was aware of and
'was intimately involved in' the decisions as to unit-splitting and pricing,
and that he orchestrated Firstjersey's balkanization ofits branches in order
to keep customers in the dark," 169 the Second Circuit determined that:
In light of the evidence presented at trial with regard to Brennan's
hands-on involvement in the pertinent decisions, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in finding that Brennan knowingly participated in Firstjersey's illegal activity and that he should be held primarily liable for its violations of the securities laws. 110
164.
165.
166.
(l 999).
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 175.
I 0 I F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996).
155 F.3d I 07 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., Romano v. SEC, 526 U.S. 1111
First]ersey Sec., Inc., IOI F.3d at 1460.
Id. at 1471.
Id. at 1472 (citation omitted).
Id.
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SEC v. US. Environmental, Inc. was a market manipulation case. The Second Circuit reversed a dismissal and held that a trader who executed buy
and sell orders by which the stock price was manipulated might be a
primary violator. 17 1 The fact that this defendant was not the mastermind
of the fraud made no difference, for Central Bank "never intended to restrict
§ l O(b) liability to supervisors or directors of securities fraud schemes while
excluding from liability subordinates who also violated the securities
laws." 172
First Jersey and US. Environmental suggest that the "bright line test" of
Shapiro and Wright is not so bright after all. Although the manner in which
the Second Circuit will ultimately resolve the apparent conflict between
these decisions is yet unclear, two observations may improve prediction.
First, US. Environmental was a straight manipulation case. Although First
Jersey was not expressly so formulated, it, too, at bottom dealt with manipulation. First Jersey itself created the price difference between the units it
repurchased and the unbundled parts it sold because First Jersey dominated both those markets. Indeed, the court found that FirstJersey violated
l 7(a) and lO(b) in part by failing to disclose "the nature of the market for
[the] securities [and] the Firm's control over that market .... "17 3 In addition, at least by implication, FirstJersey "represented that the prices paid
for [theJ securities reflected their value in a competitive market. In fact, the
market was created almost entirely by First Jersey's own activity .... " 17 4
By its very nature, manipulation usually requires many purchases and
sales. Each person who knowingly solicits or executes a trade contributing
to the manipulation, and each person who coordinates the trades for a
manipulative purpose, could be a primary violator. On the other hand, a
misstatement is a single event, and it may be quite possible to track the
misleading words to one author or speaker. Accordingly, the primary violators in a misstatement case may number far fewer than those in a
manipulation case.
Wright itself provides the second comment that may reconcile the Second
Circuit's quartet of primary liability decisions. In the course of rejecting
the view that a defendant who "substantially participates" in a misstatement could be a primary violator, Wright observed that "[i]n First Jersey,
we affirmed the imposition of primary liability under§ lO(b) on Robert
Brennan, the president, chief executive and sole owner of First Jersey Securities, Inc. Brennan had directed his employees to make false and misleading statements to customers." 175
In short, First Jersey and US. Environmental may mean nothing more in a
misstatement case than that the individual who knowingly directs a sub171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See US. .Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d at 111.
Id. at 112.
First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1467.
Id. at 1468.
Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. l 998) (emphasis added).
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ordinate to make a misstatement may be primarily liable along with the
subordinate who actually and knowingly writes or speaks the defrauding
words. If the defendant is a "secondary actor"-a term that the Second
Circuit has not defined but which appears in a corporate misstatement
case to mean those outside the corporation-then Wright imposes the additional requirement that the statement be specifically and publicly attributed to that defendant. That is the reconciliation of the four Second Circuit
primary liability decisions that seems most consistent with Central Bank.
Underwriters are somewhat difficult to place in this analytical scheme.
The court in In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholders Litigation originally
granted an underwriter's motion to dismiss on the grounds that there was
"no allegation that [the underwriter] made any of the allegedly fraudulent
representations in [the] prospectus." 176 However, the court reversed itself
on reconsideration, accepting the argument that the underwriters could
be primarily liable because, "in light of the central role underwriters play
in the issuance of securities and the special reliance placed on them by
prospective investors, they are simply not secondary actors with respect to
statements in a registration statement or prospectus." I 77 The court found
that "the underwriter's role in a public offering is such that the representations in a registration statement or prospectus are its own," 178 and that
"the statements in the ... prospectus must be deemed to be those of [the
underwriter] as much as they are those of [the issuer]."179
District court decisions in the Second Circuit, however, have frequently
determined that outsiders other than underwriters are not primarily liable.
A European bank's role in placing convertible notes did not subject it to
primary liability, even though it distributed offering documents allegedly
including misleading information, because the plaintiffs "did not allege
that [the European bank] wrote any of the allegedly fraudulent material.
Rather, they allege only that it disseminated the information to potential
investors." 18° A technical advisor to an issuer could be sued as a primary
violator only after the plaintiffs alleged that other defendants made misrepresentations that those other defendants specifically attributed to the
advisor. 1B1 An operating subsidiary was not a primary violator where plain176. In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
177. In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 993 F. Supp. 160, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
178. Id. at 162.
179. Id. at 162-63.
IBO. Jn re College Bound Consol. Litig., Nos. 93Civ.2348 (MBM), 94Civ.3033 (MBM),
1995 WL 450486, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.July 31, 1995) (granting motion to dismiss on 9(b) grounds
and distinguishing bank's role from that of accounting firm held in on primary liability theory
in In re Z<'.ZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994)).
181. The court granted the advisor's motion to dismiss in part in Gabriel Capital, L.P. v.
Natl#st Fin., Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 491, 508-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), commenting that: ''At most,
the Amended Complaint alleges that [the advisor] knew that [others] would make misrepresentations to plaintiffs about [the advisor's] role in the [issuer's business]." Id. at 510. In a
later opinion, the court held that a further amended complaint did allege a primary violation
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tiffs alleged misrepresentations in a holding company's annual reports but
did not allege that the subsidiary knowingly provided false information to
the holding company that it then included in those reports.182 Accountants
were not primarily liable for statements made by management that the accountants had recommended certain internal controls for a business and
that the accountants would oversee those internal controls and conduct
annual audits.18 3 A bank that loaned money to a subsidiary of an issuer
after the issuer signed an agreement to sell its stock but before the closing
was not primarily liable for the issuer's false representation about the cash
that it would have at closing, even though the loan created the falsity.18 4
As these decisions show, plaintiffs should have some difficulty alleging
primary liability against "secondary actors." Wright should make those
difficulties particularly acute. Moreover, it is unclear whether pre- Wright
decisions holding that those outside an issuer could be liable still survive. 185
to the extent plaintiffs pied that, during a road show, other defendants made specific statements that they attributed to the advisor. Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Fin., Inc., 122 F.
Supp. 2d 407, 418-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In an unpublished decision, the Second Circuit recently affirmed a judgment in favor of a public relations firm. Although one press release
was printed on that firm's letterhead, "there was no evidence suggesting that anyone believed
the press release represented a communication" by this outside consultant. \'Vinkler v. vVigley,
[Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,278, at 95,5 73 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2000).
182. Sotheby's Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
ii 91,059, at 94,942-43 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000) (granting a motion to dismiss and rejecting
the argument that it was reasonable to infer the subsidiary endorsed the statements in the
holding company's reports).
183. See Pahmer v. Greenberg, 926 F. Supp. 287, 304-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting motion
to dismiss).
184. See Interallianz Bank AG v. Nycal Corp., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ii 98,227, at 99,548, 99,552-53 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (granting motion to
dismiss). Also, see Scone Investments, L.P. v. American Third Market Corp., [1998 Supp. Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 90,207, at 90,849 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998), which granted
a motion to dismiss by a bank that allegedly loaned money to one defendant so that the
defendant could buy securities, pressured that defendant to sell the securities in order to bring
down debt and "released" the securities for sale to one of the plaintiffs, who accepted transfer
of the shares on the basis of a false statement that he would only need to hold them for a
week because they had already been resold at a profit.
[llhe Bank is alleged to have directed that the MKTB securities be sold, not that the
sale be effectuated by way of fraudulent misrepresentation.
****
Primary liability does not attach when the alleged fraudulent conduct is no more
than the performance of a routine market function .... Here, the Bank's financing of
the Rosehouse defendants' purchase of the MKTB securities and the release of its
shares for trading amounts to nothing more than the routine functioning of a lending
institution.
Id. at 90,854 (citation omitted). See also V.H. Farey:Jones v. Buckingham, No. CV99-4205
ADS, 2001 WL 178933, at *10-*1 I (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2001) (where one defendant allegedly
made misrepresentations causing plaintiff to sell to a second defendant in a scheme to benefit
the first and second defendants and a third besides, plaintiff stated no primary violation
against defendants two and three).
185. See, e.g., Werner v. Satterlee, Stephens, Burke & Burke, 797 F. Supp. 1196, 1207-09
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Second Circuit trial courts are much more apt to find that those inside
a corporation can be primarily liable. Audit committee members may be
primary violators for misstatements in 10-Ks that they sign, as well as
misrepresentations "that were directly authorized by the Board of Directors-for example, [representations] found in ... proxy statements." 186 A
COO may also be a primary violator for misrepresentations in an SEC
filing that he signs.187
Although district court decisions remain divided, some send primary
liability deep into the executive ranks. In re MTG Electronics rejected in
dictum the proposition "that a corporate insider must be personally responsible for a particular misstatement ... in order to be primarily liable
. . . . "188 Three cases illustrate this view.
In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litigation 189 is probably the best known of
these three. General Electric owned GE Capital Services, which in turn
owned Kidder. Kidder employed a government securities trader named
Orlandojosephjett.Jett recorded transactions which, though they had no
economic significance, generated paper profits for Kidder. Kidder pro(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (seeming to hold that a law firm could be primarily liable for statements
made in a prospectus where the law firm acted as general corporate counsel to the issuer,
assisted in sham transactions and then assisted the issuer in preparing the registration statement and prospectus that omitted key facts about the transactions); In re Union Carbide
Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458, 466-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying
motion to dismiss by investment bankers who supplied projected sale price for business units
that issuer included in public documents and holding, "[p] reparation of misleading projections or provision of the raw data for such projections can constitute direct participation in
a misrepresentation, and lead to primary lOb-5 liability .... "). It is unclear from both opinions to what extent the misleading documents specifically attributed statements in them to
the law firm or the investment bankers.
186. Jn reJWP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying summary
judgment on l 0-Ks and proxy statements). On the other hand, the committee members were
not primarily liable for "press releases issued by ... management or other statements that
were not expressly authorized by the Board of Directors." Id. (granting summary judgment
on press releases because audit committee members were entitled to judgment "to the extent
that [plaintiffs'] claims are based on alleged misrepresentations that the audit committee
defendants did not make."). In an unpublished decision, the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of an outside director where plaintiff alleged that part of an annual report
misled and where the director's signature was limited to other parts of the report. Winkler
v. Wigley, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'If 91,278, at 95,573 (2d Cir. Dec. 6,
2000) ("[The director] did sign a financial statement contained in the report, but ... this
statement concerned 1979 and 1980, the years before [the transaction about which the report
allegedly omitted material facts].").
187. See Thomson Kernaghan & Co. v. Global lntellicom, Inc., Nos. 99Civ.3005 (DLC),
99Civ.3015 (DLC), 2000 WL 640653, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2000) (finding the COO's
"filing of allegedly false and misleading documents with the SEC which misrepresented
Global's financial condition cannot be dismissed as 'merely preparatory to the fraud,' but
rather represent misrepresentations upon which plaintiffs' securities fraud claim may be
premised") (citation omitted).
188. In reMTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
189. 10 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y 1998).
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vided its financial data to GE Capital Services on a quarterly basis, and
"that data was incorporated in [GE Capital Services'] financial statements
and GE's quarterly and annual reports." 19 0 After GE disclosed the false
profits and took a one-time charge to correct its books, its stock price fell.
Shareholders sued not only General Electric, but also Kidder and four
individuals: (i) Kidder's Board Chairman and CEO; (ii) Kidder's Chief
Financial and Administrative Officer, whose responsibilities included overseeing Kidder's operations and its audit and credit functions; (iii) the head
of the Fixed Income Division in which Jett worked; and (iv) Jett himsel£
In holding that such defendants might be primarily liable for financial
statements published by General Electric, the court wrote that Central
Bank's requirement for a defendant to "make a misrepresentation does not
mean that the defendant must communicate that misrepresentation directly to the plaintiff." 191 Instead,
where the defendant has made a misstatement but used another actor
to deliver the message, the defendant still may be liable as a primary
violator....
[I]f plaintiffs can show that defendants were the original and
knowing source of the misrepresentation and that defendants knew
or should have known that misrepresentation would be communicated to investors, primary liability should attach. 192
In denying summary judgment to the head of the Fixed Income Division, the court specifically held that he might be a primary violator even
though he "was not the actual speaker for any of the alleged misstatements." 193 "[A] reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [he] was knowingly and inextricably involved in generating the false profits that led to
the misstatements."194
In re The Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. Securities Litigation 19 5 is the second case
addressing primary liability of officers who do not themselves "make"a
statement. It held that division presidents might be primarily liable for
submitting material financial misstatements from their divisions to be incorporated into Leslie Fay's consolidated financial results. 196 At least two
of the division presidents argued that "they were not spokesmen for the
Company and did not control corporate policy or communications to
shareholders or the investing public[,]" and all argued that they "did not

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 419.
Id.

918 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y 1996). Note that this case pre-dates Shapiro and Wright.
Id. at 761-62.
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draft, issue or sign any of the Company's public financial documents." 197
The court nevertheless denied their motion to dismiss and found "[t]he
fact that the Division Presidents were not responsible for consolidating and
gathering the financials, and did not sign any of the public documents does
not absolve them of liability." 198
In re Health Management, lnc. 199 is the third case suggesting that "nonspeaking" officers may be primary violators under Second Circuit law. In
Health Management, the court denied a motion for more definite statement
filed by defendants Myers and Hirsh.200 Myers and Hirsh had allegedly
participated in a scheme to include fictitious "in transit" inventory in
Health Management's balance sheet, which decreased its cost of goods
sold and thereby inflated its earnings. At the time they took the actions
asserted in the complaint, Myers and Hirsh were vice presidents of Health
Management's Pennsylvania subsidiary. Plaintiffs alleged that Myers had
attended a meeting at which executives devised the scheme, and that Hirsh
had created one false inventory form and directed another employee to
create a second phony form. The court held that "plaintiffs have alleged
facts implicating Hirsh and Myers in the 'in-transit' inventory portion of
the overall fraudulent scheme to impart to the investment community an
artificial earnings statement." 201 Expressly relying on First Jersey, the court
ruled that "plaintiffs need not allege that Hirsch and Myers made any
fraudulent statements during the Class Period. "202
Copland v. Grumet20 3 stands opposed to Kidder, Leslie Fay, and Health Management and is much more in tune with Central Bank,s instruction that those
who only aid and abet a misstatement cannot be liable for it in a private
1Ob-5 action. The Copland plaintiffs alleged that two officers cooked the
books of a subsidiary and that the subsidiary's financial figures were then
incorporated into the issuer's public financials. The court found no claim
stated against the subsidiary officers for primarily liability on the misstatements in the parent company's reports.2° 4 "[T]here were no 'statements'
which were attributed to them in the public documents at issue."20S This
reasoning seems to treat executives like the accountants in Wright and to

197. Id.at761.
198. Id. at 762.
199. 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y 1997).
200. Id. at 209-10. This case also pre-dates Shapiro and Wright.
20 I. Id. at 209.
202. Id.
203. 88 F. Supp. 2d 326, 332 (D.N.J. 1999) (relying expressly on Shapiro and Wright, although sitting in the Third Circuit, and concluding that Wright "has added a new consideration, namely that in order to hold an individual liable for material misstatements, the misrepresentations must have been attributable to that specific actor at the time of public
dissemination").
204. Id. at 332-33.
205. Id. at 332 n.9.
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require attribution of statements to the executives individually for them to
be primary violators.
However the Second Circuit resolves the ambiguity created by these
decisions, it is certain that that circuit's "group pleading" cases are wildly
out of tune with that court of appeals' definition of primary liability. At a
semantic level, the phrase "insiders and affiliates" is not anywhere near a
close description of defendants who actually make a misstatement or to
whom a misstatement is publicly and specifically attributed. Even if primary liability reaches those who order a misstatement as well as those who
make it (as Wright interprets First Jersey), even if primary liability bores down
inside a corporation to the persons who (in Kidder's words) were the "original and knowing source of the misrepresentation,'' or even if primary
liability reaches (as Health Management and Leslie Fay imply) those who take
the actions in a corporation that ultimately cause it to make a material
misrepresentation, the circle of primary violators is much smaller than
those encompassed by the word "insiders." The word "affiliates" is similarly unfocused. In no way does it point to those who actually wrote or
spoke misleading words or those outside a corporation to whom specific
statements are publicly linked. Instead of being a good predictor of who
will ultimately be found primarily liable after discovery, the Second Circuit's definition of who can be "group pleaded" into a case seems to invite
naming defendants who are not primary violators.
Aside from the linguistic disconnection, the actual holdings under the
two tests do not match. For example, "insiders and affiliates" can include
a corporate secretary,2°6 even though that position may be largely ministerial and the secretary so far removed from a statement that he or she
could not be a primary violator under Second Circuit law. The sometime
application of Second Circuit "group pleading" law to oral statements and
to writings signed by an identified individual2° 7 is similarly out of sync with
the primary liability opinions of that court of appeals. It certainly can be
the case that a group creates the text of a speech or analyst presentation
given by one executive, and documents signed by a single officer can be
written by committee. An oral statement or a document signed by one
individual, however, can also be created by the speaker or sole signatory
alone. The probability that others were sufficiently involved to be primarily
liable under Second Circuit holdings is not so high that a court should
presume such involvement. Even if an oral statement or a writing attributed to a single author is a group production, the odds are small that a
court can, at the outset of a case and without discovery, use the Luce "insiders or affiliates" formulation to correctly identify those-other than the
speaker or author-who are likely responsible for the statement under

206. See supra note I 04 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
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Shapiro or Wright or even under First Jersey, Kidder, Health Management, and
Leslie Fay.
Given the vast difference between its "group pleading" rules and its
definition of primary liability, the Second Circuit would do well to discard
the group rules altogether. If not, this circuit must undertake a major
overhaul to conform the Luce exception to its post-Central Bank decisions.

THE EFFECT OF THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
As necessary as they would otherwise be, efforts to conform "group
pleading" to definitions of primary liability may be moot. The PSLRA
may ultimately end "group pleading" in all its forms.
In private actions under section lO(b) of the 1934 Act, the PSLRA
requires that plaintiffs plead "with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind," which
is scienter in a 1O(b) case; demands that complaints "specify each statement
alleged to have been misleading [and] ... the reasons why the statement
is misleading;" and imposes a stay of discovery until the trial court decides
motions to dismiss. 20s
The PSLRA's command that plaintiffs plead scienter with particularity
should end the erroneous reliance that some courts have placed on "group
pleading" to satisfy that element of a lO(b) case.2°9 The more important
question, however, is whether the PSLRA ends "group pleading" altogether. The lower courts are split on this issue.210
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The requirement for specific scienter
pleading is codified at subsection (b)(2), the requirement that each misleading statement be
specified at subsection (b)(l), and the discovery stay at subsection (b)(3)(B). Courts have interpreted the new scienter pleading rule differently, and this Article will not review those
opinions. The PSLRA contained many other provisions besides the three mentioned in the
text (e.g., replacing joint and several liability with proportionate liability for many defendants,
defining a procedure for choosing and the substantive standard for selecting the lead plaintiff
in lO(b) class actions, establishing a formula capping lO(b) damages and creating a "safe
harbor" for "forward-looking statements").
209. Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ill. 2000), confuses "group pleading"
with "how each individual defendant was supposed to know that the statements ... were
false," but correctly concludes that the PSLRA means that "[t)o the extent the plaintiffs
plead scienter based exclusively on an individual defendant's position in [the company's]
hierarchy, their claims must be dismissed." Id. at 836-37.
210. Cases holding that "group pleading" does not survive the PSLRA: In re Premier
Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,293, at 95,654 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 8, 2000); In re Ciena Corp. Sec. Litig., 99 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 n.11 (D. Md. 2000)
(remarking, though not deciding the question, "that application of [group pleading] doctrine
to nonspeaking defendants would seem to be inconsistent with the strict pleading requirements of the [PSLRA] "); Zishka v. American Pad & Paper Co., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,208, at 95,044 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2000); In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec.
Litig., [Current Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,243, at 95,287 n.3 (S.D. Cal.July 18,
2000) (stating in the footnote that while the group pleading doctrine did not apply, "there

Don't Call Me a Securities Law Groupie

1047

Opinions ruling that the PSLRA forecloses "group pleading" divide into
three categories. The first set points to the Act's requirement that plaintiffs
plead each defendant's scienter individually and reasons that it would
make little sense to demand such particularized allegations of each defenmay be circumstances where it would be appropriate to attribute statements to a group of
defendants, such as where a corporation's officers and directors are few in number and make
corporate decisions on a group basis."); In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,245, at 91,303 (S.D. Cal.July 11, 2000) (same); Calliott v. HFS,
Inc., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 90,939, at 94,030-31 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 2000); Branca v. Paymantech, Inc., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
ii 90,911, at 93,850 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2000); Marra v. Tel-Save Holdings, Inc., [2000 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 90,480, at 92,288 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 1999); In re Home
Health Corp. of Am., Inc. Sec. Litig., [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
ii 90,414, at 91,877 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 29, 1999); Coates v. Heartland Wireless Communications,
Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 910, 915-16 (N. D. Tex. 1998); Allison v. Brooktree Corp., 999 F. Supp.
1342, 1350 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
Cases holding that group pleading survives the PSLRA include: In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D. Ohio 2000); In re Splash Tech. Holdings,
Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,249, at 95,351-52 n.13 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 29, 2000) (noting that although the "cases finding tension between the grouppleading doctrine and the [PSLRA] are more persuasively reasoned, the Court assumes for
purposes of its analysis that the group published information doctrine survives the [Act]");
Stanley v. Safeskin Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,221, at 95, 145
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2000); In re USA Talks.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,231, at 95,235 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2000) (seeming to employ group
pleading after noting that Ninth Circuit has not addressed the effect of the PSLRA); In re
Solv-Ex Corp. Sec. Litig., 96Civ.7575 (RMB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13113, at *15 (S.D.N.Y
Sept. 6, 2000); In re Hi/fn, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C99-453 I SI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11631,
at *36-37 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2000) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has not reached the PSLRA's
effect on group pleading, but then finding that the doctrine would not save the relevant
plaintiffs' allegations anyway); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ii 91,258, at 95,410 n.5 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2000) (stating, unclearly, that,
"[a]lthough some of the defendants argue that after the [PSLRA], the 'group pleading doctrine' can no longer be used, the Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue
and at least one district court in the circuit has assumed the doctrine's continued viability.
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that each of the individual defendants, due to their high
ranking positions at Cyberguard were involved in controlling the content of the information
released by Cyberguard.") (citations omitted); In re System Software Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 90,910, at 93,84 7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2000)
("Without deciding the issue, this court adopts the group publication theory-to the extent
that any inferences mentioned above may seem to rely on that theory-for purposes of this
opinion only."); In re AgriBioTech Sec. Litig., [1999-2000 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
ii 90,771, at 93,757 (D. Nev. Mar. 2, 2000); In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. Supp.
2d 1342, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2000); In re The Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C.
2000); In re Secure Computing Corp. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 810, 821 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(granting motion to dismiss but apparently in this part of the opinion giving guidance to
plaintiffs for repleading); In re American Bank Note Holographies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp.
2d 424, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 988
(E.D. Mo. 1999); In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 219 (S.D.N.Y 1999); In re
Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1340-41 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923, 939 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (appearing to conclude that
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dant's state of mind while permitting some defendants' connection with
the misstatements to be pled by "group" allegations. Coates v. Heartland
Wireless Communications, Inc.211 provides perhaps the best statement of this
position:
a plaintiff must state with particularity the facts that give rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). This requirement is fairly interpreted
to require that a plaintiff allege facts regarding scienter as to each
defendant. So interpreted, [this section] is consistent with the
[PSLRA's] policy of protecting defendants from unwarranted fraud
claims and strike suits. It is nonsensical to require that a plaintiff
specifically allege facts regarding scienter as to each defendant, but
to allow him to rely on group pleading in asserting that the defendant
made the statement or omission. 2 12
Some courts respond that this view conflates two different 1Ob-5 elements. One element is that the defendant make the challenged statement.
The defendant's state of mind is a separate element. As the court in In re
BankAmerica Corp. Securities Litigation2 I 3 stated " [c] ases holding that group
group pleading continues after the PSLRA until the Seventh Circuit holds otherwise); In re
Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y 1999); In re PETsMART,
Inc., Sec. Litig., 61 F. Supp. 2d 982, 997 (D. Ariz. 1999) (stating in a confused discussion
that the court "do [es] not dispute plaintiffs contention that the doctrine survives the
[PSLRA]" but doing so in the context of applying the "opportunity" prong of the "motive
and opportunity" test for evaluating scienter allegations); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F.
Supp. 2d 935, 949 n. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (failing to decide the question but remarking that
"[a]lthough it is unclear whether the group pleading doctrine survives under the [PSLRA],
the Court will assume for the purposes of this Motion that the ... doctrine is still viable.");
Copperstone v. TCSI Corp., No. C97-3495 SBA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *52-*54
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting the defense argument that the PSLRA abolishes group pleading,
then proceeding to hold that plaintiffs had not pleaded sufficient facts to take advantage of
the doctrine anyway); Schlagel v. Learning Tree Int'!, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,403, at 91,815 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1998); Schaffer v. Evolving Sys., Inc.,
29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1225 (D. Colo. 1998); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., I F. Supp.
2d 1096, 1108 (D. Nev. 1998); Genna v. Digital Link Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1044 (N.D.
Cal. 1997) (commenting, apparently as dicta, "[d)efendants claim that only defendants who
actually made statements can be held liable because the PSLRA abolishes group pleading
.... [T]here is a potential for liability if the allegedly false or misleading statements are
shown to be the collective actions of the defendant officers. However, because plaintiff has
not met his burden of pleading false and misleading statements, the court does not determine
at this time whether any individual defendant should be dismissed with prejudice."). This
note does not include post-PSLRA cases that employ group pleading without discussing
whether the PSLRA makes reliance on such pleading wrong.
211. 26 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
212. Id. at 916. See Branca v. Paymentech, Inc., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 90,911, at 93,850 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2000) (following Coates v. Heartland Wireless
Communications, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (N.D. Tex. 1999)).
213. 78 F. Supp. 2d 976 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
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pleading is no longer available ... state that because the [PSLRA] requires
that ... scienter be pled with regard to each act or omission, the group
pleading doctrine was overruled sub silentio by the Act. However, the [group
pleading] doctrine has nothing to do with scienter. "214
A second set of decisions holding that the PSLRA ends "group pleading" relies not only on the Act's requirement for specific scienter allegations but also on the Act's command that a plaintiff specifically identify
misstatements or omissions. Allison v. Brooktree Corp.2 15 reasons:

[T] he continued vitality of the judicially created group-published doctrine is suspect since the [PSLRA] specifically requires that the untrue statements or omissions be set forth with particularity as to 'the defendant' and that
scienter be plead in regards to 'each act or omission' sufficient to give
'rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.'2 16
More important, however, than the ambiguity as to which defendants
are sued on which statements-a matter that plaintiffs might seek to address
by conclusory pleading that defendants A, B, and C were all in a group
responsible for statements l and 2-is the failure to allege particular facts
to show that each of the defendants actually drafted or spoke the offending
words. Ultimately, that is the fundamental failure of group pleading.
A third group of cases simply states that "group pleading" is inconsistent
with the Act's overall emphasis on factually specific allegations.2 17 This
view has considerable force, as "group pleading" was created by judges

214. Id. at 988 (citations omitted).
215. 999 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
216. Id. at 1350 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Other courts have questioned the
doctrine's continuing vitality on this same reasoning. See In re Premier Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig.,
[Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I! 91,243, at 95,654 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 8, 2000); In
re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,243, at 95,287
(S.D. Cal.July 18, 2000); In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,245, at 95,303 (S.D. Cal.July 11, 2000); Calliott v. HFS, Inc., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'IJ 90,939, at 94,032 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2000) (following
Marra, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'I! 90,480); Marra v. Tel-Save Holdings, Inc.,
[1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'll 90,480, at 92,288 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 1999).
217. See In re Ciena Corp. Sec. Litig., 99 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 n.11 (D. Md. 2000) (stating
that the "application of that doctrine to non-speaking defendants would seem to be inconsistent with the strict pleading requirements of the [PSLRA]."); Zishka v. American Pad &
Paper Co., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'll 91,208, at 95,044 (N.D. Tex. Sept, 13, 2000)
(rejecting "the notion of'group pleading,' and 'group publication' and conclud[ing] that such
concepts, if previously sustainable, did not survive the adoption of [PSLRAJ. To comply with
the [Act], Plaintiffs thus must plead with particularity their allegations against each individual
Defendant.") (citation omitted); In re Home Health Corp. of Am., Inc. Sec. Litig., [1999
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'IJ 90,414, at 91,877 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1999) (agreeing
"that the group published information doctrine is inconsistent with the [PSLRA's] pleading
requirements").
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and favors plaintiffs by permitting them to name defendants without specifically alleging facts against them to support a required element of the
case. This does seem contrary to the whole thrust of the PSLRA.
One rejoining argument is that the PSLRA was itself a specific piece
of legislation, that Congress targeted the changes it chose to make and
that courts should not infer that Congress intended to make others. Because Congress did not insert a requirement that plaintiffs plead particular
facts to connect each defendant to misrepresentations or omissions, none
should be judicially added simply because courts conclude that such a
change logically compliments the pleading reforms that Congress
introduced.
The rebuttal, however, is that Congress through the PSLRA deliberately
drove the courts towards specific pleading. It expressly required specific
scienter pleading and specific allegations to identify which statements
plaintiffs contend to be misleading and why they were misleading. It is
hubris for the courts to conclude that, just because Congress did not also
single out group pleading for abolition, the bench should retain a judgemade generality which is so out of step with the legislature's unmistakable
signal that only specificity will prevent abuse.
Although the cases finding that the PSLRA abolishes "group pleading"
have weight, the opinions that seem to support group pleading's survival
after the Act are far less persuasive. Some say nothing more than that the
court assumes the continued existence of the protocol only for purposes
of the one decision containing the comment.2 18 Others say little more than
that they continue to apply "group pleading" because the courts of appeals
in their circuits have not yet held that they should stop.219 Some, like In re
218. See In re Splash Tech. Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
'1] 91,249, at 95,351-52 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2000) (see quotation in note 210 supra); In re
Systems Software Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. '1] 90,910,
at 93,84 7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2000) (noting also that the Seventh Circuit has not decided the
question and that two cases in the district and one outside the district had employed group
pleading after the PSLRA: Koehler v. NationsBank Corp., No. 96C2050, 1997 WL 80928
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1997) (but not addressing whether PSLRA ends "group pleading"); Powers
v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1040-41 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (same); In re Discovery Zone Sec.
Litig., 943 F. Supp. 924, 937-38 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (same)); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F.
Supp. 2d 935, 949 n. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting, "[a]lthough it is unclear whether the group
pleading doctrine survives under the [PSLRA], the Court will assume for the purposes of
this Motion that the ... doctrine is still viable.").
219. See Stanley v. Safeskin Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'IJ 91,221, 95, 145
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 1999) (noting that the In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp.
746 (N.D. Cal. 1997), decision had employed group pleading in a PSLRA case and stating,
"[t]he Court is unaware of any Ninth Circuit decision, to date, that has rejected the group
pleading presumption"); In re USA Talks.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 'IJ 91,231, at 95,235 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2000) (noting that the "Ninth Circuit has not
specifically addressed whether the heightened pleading standard for securities fraud cases,
imposed by the [PSLRA], has eliminated the 'group pleading' or 'group published' doctrine"); In re Hi/fn, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C99-453 l SI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11631, at *36
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BankAmerica Corp. in the passage set out above, argue that the PSLRA
changed other pleading rules but did not specifically abrogate "group
pleading" and that courts should not infer that Congress sought to end
the group rule.22° "Group pleading" itself, however, was never based on
any statute. Accordingly, it may be quite appropriate for courts to reconsider this judicially created rule if it appears-as it does-to be contrary
to the overall approach that Congress took.
A few opinions justify the use of the pleading protocol by pointing to
post-PSLRA decisions that employ "group pleading" without discussing
the Act's effect on such allegations. 221 The cases on which these opinions,
however, rely cannot constitute authority on a point they do not even
address.
One decision preserves "group pleading" on the basis that it creates
only a "rebuttable presumption"222 and another on the basis that it creates
a "reasonable presumption."223 This, however, avoids the question, which
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2000) (stating that "the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue" and
citing to In re Secure Computing Corp. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 810 (N.D. Cal. 2000), as
a decision that "upheld the doctrine's continued application."); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp.,
[Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ii 91,258, at 95,410 n.5 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2000) (stating
that "the Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue and at least one district
court in the circuit has assumed the doctrine's continued viability"); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig.,
89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("Although the Court recognizes that some courts
have questioned the continuing vitality of the group pleading doctrine, we find that the
rationale behind the group pleading doctrine sound and will not disturb it absent direction
from the Eleventh Circuit. The Court notes that this conclusion is consistent with both the
language of the PSLRA, and the overwhelming majority of courts to consider the matter.");
Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923, 939 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ("Until
receiving clarification from the Seventh Circuit, this court is unwilling to read the [PSLRA]
as abolishing all remnants of notice pleading and the liberal standards under which motions
to dismiss are viewed."); Schlagel v. Learning Tree Int'!, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ii 90,403, at 91,815-16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1998) (''Although the Court recognizes that some courts have questioned the continuing vitality of the group-pleading doctrine
... , the questioning occurred in the context of attributing liability to seemingly unrelated
executive employees. Until the Ninth Circuit speaks otherwise, the Court finds the rationale
behind the group-pleading doctrine sound and will not disturb it.").
220. See quotation in text at note 214, supra. In In re Strastosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., I F. Supp.
2d I 096 (D. Nev. 1998), the court held, "[d]efendants offer no case authority for their proposition that group pleading has been sub silentio abolished by the [PSLRA], and this Court
declines to adopt such a proposition." Id. at 1 I 08. The court also noted and relied on a
district court decision, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 759 (N.D. Cal.
1997), which employed group pleading in a case governed by the PSLRA but did not discuss
any argument that the Act abrogated such pleading. Id. See also In re American Bank Note
Holographies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 424, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is well settled
that plaintiffs may engage in so-called group-pleading under IO(b) and Rule lOb-5; nothing
in the [PSLRA] has altered that doctrine.").
221. See supra note 220 (citing Strastosphere references to the Silicon Graphics decision). See
also supra note 218 (citing In re System Sefiware Assocs., Inc. references to the Discovery :(one and
Koehler cases).
222. In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., l 05 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
223. Jn re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 988 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
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is whether such a pleading "presumption" should be tolerated at all, given
the Act's several requirements for specific factual allegations. One case
analyzes the Tenth Circuit's pre-PSLRA scienter pleading rules, reasons
that those rules track PSLRA requirements, and then concludes that the
Tenth Circuit's pre-PSLRA "group pleading" authority must also survive
the Act.22 4 But this is a non sequitur, as "group pleading" does not address
scienter but instead each defendant's connection to misstatements or
omissions.
A few opinions endorse post-PSLRA "group pleading" without any
reasoning at all.22 5 The remaining cases supporting such pleading rely on
the other opinions summarized above. 226
With the arguments that the pleading protocol survives the Act quite
weak and those holding that the Act abolishes "group pleading" not yet
universally accepted, the debate remains open. That debate, however,
should consider one further point. The purpose of "group pleading" is to
permit plaintiffs to name as defendants those who are likely to have had
a sufficient hand in the offending statements so that they could be primary
violators but who cannot be tied to the statements by specificfacts without discovery.22 7
224. See Schaffer v. Evolving Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1225 n.5 (D. Colo. 1998).
225. See In re PETsMART, Inc. Sec. Litig., 61 F. Supp. 2d 982, 997 (D. Ariz. 1999);
Copperstone v. TCSI Corp. No. C973495 SBA, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20978, at *52-*54
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 1999); Genna v. Digital Link Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1044 (N.D.
Cal. 1997).
226. See In reSolv-Ex Corp. Sec. Litig., 96Civ.7575 (RMB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13113,
at* 15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000); In re The Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C.
2000); In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D. Ohio
2000); In re Secure Computing Corp. Sec. Litig. 120 F. Supp. 2d 810, 821 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
In re AgriBioTech Sec. Litig., [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '\[ 90, 771,
at 93,757 (D. Nev. Mar. 2, 2000); In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 219
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
227. See, for example, In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 706 (D. Del. 2000), where
the court responded to defense argument "that the act of signing, or participating in the
preparation of, group-published documents does not amount to a misstatement or omission."
Id. at 720-21. The court reasoned:
[p]laintiffs have not yet had the opportunity to take discovery to determine the role that
these defendants played in the Company, and the extent to which they were knowledgeable of the alleged inadequacy of the Company's loan loss reserves. In light of these
defendants' membership on the Company's Audit Committee, Financial Oversight
Committee, or Executive Committee, the court will permit plaintiffs to conduct discovery to determine whether these defendants made actionable misstatements or omissions.

Id. See also Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923, 939 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(answering defense arguments about group pleading and outside directors: "The exact extent
of each of the individual defendant's role and duties within USN, and their corresponding
knowledge, cannot be ascertained until after discovery. Plaintiffs' recovery against any particular defendant will depend on actual proof tying that defendant to a material misrepresentation."); In re Alliance Pharm. Sec. Litig., Nos. 92-1380-IEG (AJB), 92-1445, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11351, at *37 n.14 (noting the group publishing doctrine "is justified by the
need to allow plaintiffs discovery before they can pin down which directors and officers were
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That rationale for the protocol is completely at odds with the discovery
stay that the PSLRA imposes at the outset of a case while defendants test
the factual allegations of a complaint with motions to dismiss. 22s That stay
is designed to stop "sue first and ask questions later" tactics. As the Ninth
Circuit stated: "Congress clearly intended that complaints in these securities actions should stand or fall based on the actual knowledge of the
plaintiffs rather than information produced by the defendants after the
action has been filed. "22 9 This reasoning for the stay is unreservedly hostile
to the notion of "group pleading," which is precisely that plaintiffs should
be able to name defendants without having "actual knowledge" that those
defendants made the statements that plaintiffs claim are wrong.

WHETHER THE PLEADING PROTOCOL MAKES SENSE
Putting to one side the effect of such recent developments such as Central
Bank and the PSLRA, there is a more fundamental question: Does "group
pleading" make sense? Put another way: Is the title that a defendant holds
a reliable indicator that he or she is presumptively likely to have written
or contributed to a particular false statement in a corporate disclosure?

actually involved in certain corporate actions."); In re AnnTaylor Stores Sec. Litig., 807 F.
Supp. 990, 1004-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating, "[p]rior to discovery, plaintiffs are not expected
to pinpoint precisely who uttered the statements ... [, and endorsing that,] 'a plaintiff may
not be able to plead the precise role of each defendant when a group of defendants has acted
in concert .... Under those circumstances, it is appropriate to plead the actions of the group
and leave development of individual liability questions until some discovery has been undertaken, rather than to dismiss the plaintiff because he does not have what may be concealed
information.'") (citingJackson v. First Fed. Sav. F.A., 709 F. Supp. 863, 878 (E.D. Ark. 1988);
Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 95 7, 962 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (discussing
RICO claim and dismissing for other reasons, citing Wool and reasoning so: "[c]onsidering
that no discovery has occurred, the plaintiffs' statement of the defendants' respective roles is
adequate."), case reinstated under Exchange Act section 27A, 793 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wash.
1992); Nicholas v. Poughkeepsie Savings Bank/FSB, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,606, at 97,842 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1990) ("It would be virtually impossible before there had been any discovery for the plaintiffs to delineate which defendants
were responsible for which acts. It is sufficient in the Court's view for the plaintiff to allege
the positions held by the defendants and charge them collectively rather than specify their
individual conduct.").
228. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
229. Medhekar v. U.S. District Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that the discovery stay in the PSLRA applies to initial disclosures under Rule
26(a) and related local rules); SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. U.S. District Court for the N. Dist. of
Cal., 189 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Medhekar, 99 F.3d at 328, while finding that
a district court erred in permitting limited discovery to learn, among other things, the relationship between the issuer defendant and an investment banking/brokerage house defendant
employing an analyst following the issuer). But see Vacold LLC v. Cerami, No. OOCIV.4024
(AGS), 2001WL167704, at *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2001) (granting plaintiff relief from stay
in order to conduct limited merits discovery; recognizing that its holding is contrary to SG
Cowen).

1054 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 56, May 200 I

Both the Ninth and the Second Circuits adopted "group pleading"
without empirical evidence before them. Plaintiffs' briefs in J#Jol and Luce
were devoid of citations to studies showing such a strong pattern of participation in corporate disclosures by individuals or entities occupying certain positions that courts could properly presume involvement by such
potential defendants in certain types of communications.230 It is not clear
that the world reflects such a pattern.
Consider the financial statements that an issuer publishes in a press
release each quarter. The degree to which the CEO is involved in creating
the release may vary. If the release purports to quote the CEO, it may be
fair that he or she be held accountable for that quotation. It is unrealistic
to presume, however, that the CEO created the numbers in the release. The
CEO may have played a key role, even becoming involved in revenue
recognition decisions on large transactions that could mean the difference
between meeting analyst estimates or not. On the other hand, the CEO
may have had virtually no involvement in revenue recognition decisions
or other accounting matters, leaving all of that to the finance staff. 23 1 The
probability that the CEO was so involved in the creation of a specific false
number so that the CEO could be primarily liable for that number is not
high enough to justify a presumption.
This problem with the presumption underlying "group pleading" grows
larger when courts apply group analysis to long documents such as a 10-K.
Although it may be safe to presume that such documents are the product
of collective effort, it is also likely that different individuals write different
sections. Thus, the COO or someone on the COO's staff may have principal or complete drafting responsibility for a paragraph in the MD&A on
an operational issue. On the other hand, the COO may have nothing to
do with drafting the section devoted to liquidity. It makes no common
sense to include the COO as a "group" defendant in a case based on an
alleged misrepresentation regarding liquidity simply because the COO or
a member of the COO's staff was a part ofa team that drafted the 10-K.

CONCLUSION
If the courts keep "group pleading" at all, then in light of Central Bank
and each circuit's definition of primary liability (i) at least some of the
230. See the discussion of "group pleading" in: Opening Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., (9th Cir.July 7, 1986) (No. 85-2674), 33-34 (on file with
The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law). Also see the discussions of"group
pleading" in: Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, Luce v. Edelstein, (2d Cir. March 28, 1986) (No.
86-7120) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); Reply
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Luce v. Edelstein, 2-4 (2d Cir. May 5, l 986) (No. 86-7 l 20) (on
file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
231. Whether the CEO should be liable on the basis of signing an SEC filing containing
the financials, rather than a presumption that he participated in the preparation of the
financials, is a different question. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing
Howard v. Everex, 228 E3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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Ninth Circuit "group pleading" rules should be revised; and (ii) the Second
Circuit's "group pleading" rules should be completely overhauled. The
more fundamental question is whether "group pleading" should survive
at all. It is inconsistent with the PSLRA's overall emphasis on specific
pleading and inconsistent with the discovery stay. It depends upon factual
assumptions about the business world that judges have made without empirical evidence as a guide and that experience suggests are false. Courts
would do best to put this pleading protocol to the sword.

